In the current economic environment, many banks have lost significant capital and are under immense pressure, regulatory and otherwise, to recapitalize. Failure to recapitalize within time frames set by bank regulators can result in a bank’s seizure by its chartering authority and an FDIC receivership.

Introduction

The FDIC is currently responding to one of the worst financial crises in the history of the nation’s banking system. Sheila Bair, Chairman of the FDIC, expects that 2010 “will be the high water mark for the banking crisis.”1 Just over the last two years, 268 banks have failed in the United States, which is nearly ten times the number of failed banks during the prior eight-year period.2

On 24 November 2009, ASIC released Consultation Paper 124 which provides guidance for directors on their duty to prevent insolvent trading which is imposed by section 588G of the Corporations Act 2001.

The economic climate over the past two years has seen a growing number of corporate insolvencies. There is also evidence that directors, and particularly directors of small to medium size enterprises, do not fully understand their duty to prevent insolvent trading.

Bankruptcy-related developments during the first half of this year have sent shock waves
through the secured lending, derivative, and distressed debt trading communities. Several
notable decisions may significantly affect the way these entities operate and calculate risk,
and result in changes to standard documentation. Until recently, a proposed overhaul of
Bankruptcy Rule 2019 threatened to discourage distressed debt investors, including hedge
funds, from participating in bankruptcy proceedings as part of an ad hoc committee or group.

Before 1993, the question of whether a creditor of a corporation being wound up had received an unfair preference from that corporation was determined under section 122 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). In 1993, a new Part 5.7B was inserted into the Corporations Act to deal with voidable transactions such as unfair preferences. Since then two lines of divergent judicial authority have developed:

On May 17, the FDIC issued a proposed rule that would require certain insured depository institutions to submit a contingent resolution plan outlining how they could be separated from their parent structures and wound down in an orderly and timely manner. Institutions with assets greater than $10 billion that are subsidiaries of a holding company with total assets of more than $100 billion would be subject to this proposal.

On April 23, the FDIC published additional Q&As on the Statement of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank Acquisitions (“Policy Statement”) issued in September 2009. The Q&As clarify that there is no requirement that investors must have held their ownership for a specific amount of time.

The FDIC voted to extend the safe harbor provided under 12 C.F.R. § 360.6 until September 30, 2010, from the FDIC’s ability, as conservator or receiver, to recover assets securitized or participated out by an insured depository institution. When the safe harbor was initially adopted in 2000, the FDIC provided important protections for securitizations and participations by confirming that, in the event of a bank failure, the FDIC would not try to reclaim loans transferred into such transactions so long as an accounting sale had occurred.

Kookmin Bank v Rainy Sky

We have received a number of urgent enquiries about the outcome of the Kookmin Bank case, which was recently decided by the Court of Appeal, in London. The judgment was issued at the end of May 2010 and held, in effect, that refund guarantees -- relating to advance payments of about US$46 million -- were unenforceable by the Buyers to whom the guarantees had been issued. Given the importance of refund guarantees to our shipping and banking clients, we are issuing this summary of the judgment and its general significance.