In its bankruptcy filing under Japan's Civil Rehabilitation Law, Mt. Gox claims 6.5 billion yen, or around $64 million, in liabilities and 3.84 billion yen, or around $38 million, in assets.

Introduction

In late February 2014, MtGox Co., Ltd (“MtGox”), once the largest bitcoin exchange in the world, suspended all trading on its exchange after internal investigations revealed a loss of approximately 750,000 of its customers’ bitcoins worth nearly $473 million. That loss caused MtGox to become insolvent.

On April 16, Mt. Gox’s civil rehabilitation proceeding in Tokyo (something similar to a U.S. Chapter 11) was dismissed and the initial stages of a bankruptcy liquidation under Japanese law began. An Interim Administrator (Nobuaki Kobaysahi) has been named until the Japanese court decides whether the liquidation will begin and whether a different Administrator replaces the Interim Administrator. How this situation came to be is an interesting tale.

The Bankruptcy Filing

Sale Hearing

On September 20, 2008, the Bankruptcy Court approved the sale of certain assets of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. ("LBHI") and Lehman Brothers Inc. ("LBI"),1 including those related to its Canadian Capital Markets and Investment Banking businesses, to Barclays Capital, Inc. ("Barclays"). The sale was approved despite the filing of over 80 objections raising a number of procedural and substantive issues. The Purchase and Sale Agreement was subsequently amended, and a clarifying letter filed, to address a number of the questions and concerns raised.

Capital call subscription credit facilities (each, a “Facility”) continued their positive momentum in 2013  and had an excellent year as an asset class. As in the recent past, investor (“Investor”) funding performance remained as pristine as ever, and the only exclusion events we are aware of involved funding  delinquencies by noninstitutional Investors (in many cases subsequently cured). Correspondingly, we  were not consulted on a single Facility payment event of default in 2013.

The dueling judicial decisions in Mexico and the United States regarding the proposed restructuring of the Mexican enterprise, Vitro S.A.B., de C.V., and its affiliates (collectively, “Vitro”), and its strong opposition by a group of U.S. noteholders, became must-read thrillers for finance and bankruptcy professionals, as well as distressed-debt investors.

Over the last several years, the number of Chapter 15 filings has continued to grow. One of the most prominent of these bankruptcy filings is the Vitro S.A.B. de C.V. case. When last we reported on theVitro case, the Texas bankruptcy court administering the Chapter 15 case had denied recognition to the Mexican restructuring plan of Vitro because the plan provided third party releases to non-debtors. See Vitro, S.A.B.: Bankruptcy Court Refuses to Recognize Mexican Concurso That Releases Claims Against Non-Debtors” (November 2012).

Those of us old enough to remember the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (or NAFTA) recall its promise of free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital between Canada, the United States, and Mexico, and greater economic prosperity in each of these countries.