Introduction

Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, which deals with cross-border insolvency cases, took effect nearly 11 years ago.(1) Congress enacted Chapter 15 in 2005 to replace Bankruptcy Code Section 304, which previously addressed transnational insolvencies.(2) Chapter 15 largely incorporates the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, which was promulgated in May 1997. The Model Law is designed:

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System proposed a rule that would require US global systemically important banking institutions to amend their contracts for certain common financial transactions to preclude the immediate termination of such contracts if a firm enters bankruptcy or a resolution process. Relevant contracts – termed “qualified financial contracts” – that would have to be amended include those used for derivatives, securities lending and short time financing such as repurchase agreements.

Global—On August 29, 2014, the International Capital MarketAssociation (“ICMA”), a group of banks and investors,announced a proposal designed to reduce the ability of holdoutbondholders to undermine sovereign debt restructurings. The plan was created after meetings convened by the U.S. Treasury Department in the aftermath of Greece’s debt restructuring and came on the heels of Argentina’s second default on its sovereign debt in 13 years.

The world’s second-largest economy (China) stumbled; Japan receded; the U.K. showed signs of life; the war-torn Middle East reeled; oil revenue-dependent Russia, Brazil, and Venezuela took body blows; and the European Union exhaled after narrowly avoiding Grexit (and possibly Brexit), only to confront a refugee crisis of alarming (and expensive) proportions, as well as a demonstrated terrorist threat from the self-proclaimed Islamic State.

A Good Year for the U.S.

The eyes of the financial world were on the U.S. during 2013. The view was dismaying and encouraging in roughly equal parts. The U.S. rang in the new year with a post-last-minute deal to avoid the Fiscal Cliff that kicked negotiations over "sequestration"—$110 billion in across-the-board cuts to military and domestic spending—two months down the road, but raised income taxes (on the wealthiest Americans) for the first time in two decades. 

This past Saturday, October 11, 2014, marked an important day in the too-big-too-fail regulatory and industry initiative. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA) announced on Saturday that 18 major global banks (G-18) have agreed to sign a new ISDA Resolution Stay Protocol, developed in coordination with the Financial Stability Board, to support cross-border resolution and reduce systemic risk.

Given the current worldwide economic climate, the number of companies facing insolvency that have assets in multiple jurisdictions around the world has increased dramatically. It is not unusual in today’s global economy for a corporation to have commercial offices, production plants and/ or research facilities in many different countries. A company that is faced with the bleak picture of insolvency may be forced to make decisions on whether to seek protection under a number of different statutory structures.

From modest beginnings, the concept of Cross-Border Insolvency Protocols as a means of enhancing cooperation between administrations in international cases has become an established practice in major cases. From their origins in the International Bar Association’s Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat through the early Protocols in Maxwell Communication and Everfresh Beverages, Protocols have become a mainstay in international reorganizations and restructurings.

The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has held that a bankruptcy trustee appointed in a non-U.S. bankruptcy case did not need authority from a U.S. court to take possession and control of a foreign debtor’s assets located in the United States, and transfer them.

A U.S. Bankruptcy Court (the “Bankruptcy Court”) recently enjoined a Hong Kong-based investor from exercising its shareholder purchase rights in an Asian joint venture.[1] The Bankruptcy Court’s order also prevents the investor from proceeding with litigation to enforce its rights in a Hong Kong court. Neither of the joint venture partners, or the joint venture itself, are debtors in a domestic or foreign insolvency proceeding. Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy Court ruled that injunctive relief was warranted because the investor’s actions were disrupting a sale process for the U.S.