In re Foamex Int’l, Inc., et al.,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that the damage cap contained in section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code applies not only to rental payments, but also to damages from the breach of any lease covenants, including maintenance and repair obligations. In doing so, the Court reduced a specific landlord’s claim and recovery by more than $700,000 and established precedent that could diminish the claims of landlords in other cases pending and filed in Delaware.
Background
Equitable mootness is a doctrine grounded in equity pursuant to which an appeals court will dismiss an appeal of a bankruptcy order — even if effective relief could conceivably have been granted — because the implementation of such relief (e.g., the reversal of a bankruptcy court order) would be inequitable to third parties. This doctrine may be applied to achieve the necessary finality of bankruptcy orders and decisions that is required to effectuate the successful, expedient reorganization of debtors in bankruptcy.2
In re Adelphia Communications Corp.,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently held that neither a creditor’s aggressive litigation tactics resulting in the creditor’s prospective receipt under a proposed plan of special consideration for voting in favor of the plan, which special consideration other members of the same class that voted against the plan would not obtain, nor the creditor’s ownership of claims in several debtors, in a multi-debtor Chapter 11 case, was a sufficient basis for the “draconian sanction” of disallowing such creditor’s votes
In a recent decision by the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, In re Scotia Development, LLC,1 Judge Richard S. Schmidt denied the motions of several creditors and the State of California seeking transfer of venue from the Southern District of Texas to the Northern District of California, finding that venue was proper in Texas and that California would not be a more convenient forum for the financial restructuring of the debtors.
Background
On April 18, 2007, in Fla. Dep’t. of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (In re Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.),1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the stamp tax exemption of 11 USC § 1146(c)2 may apply to transfers of assets that were necessary to the consummation of a bankruptcy plan of reorganization and were made prior to confirmation of the plan. In reaching this decision, the Eleventh Circuit declined to follow decisions of the Third and Fourth Circuits to the contrary and thus created a split among the circuits on this issue.
While investors and lenders brace for the next wave of chapter 11 filings, those who are parties to intercreditor agreements need to take stock on how their relationship with their fellow creditors and the borrower may be impacted by a bankruptcy filing by the borrower. If the borrower is in financial extremes, the primary lender who is secured by all the business assets may be unwilling or unable to extend additional credit to the troubled borrower.
How to Keep Follow-On Investments from Getting Squeezed
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, on July 9, 2007, decisively affirmed a bankruptcy court's dismissal of an equitable subordination complaint filed by a creditors' committee against eight investment fund lenders. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Applied Theory Corporation v. Halifax Fund, L.P., et al. (In re Applied Theory Corporation), ___ F.3d ___, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 16180 (2d Cir. July 9, 2007).
A recent decision out of a North Carolina bankruptcy court has reopened the question of whether a physical supply contract may qualify as a forward contract or swap agreement for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. Although previous U.S. case law determined that those terms included commodity supply agreements, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina disagreed.
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado, applying Colorado law, has denied an insurer's motion for summary judgment and granted in part motions for partial summary judgment by the policyholder's former CEO and a bankruptcy trustee as assignee of the policyholder's former directors. Genesis Ins. Co. v. Crowley, 2007 WL 1832039 (D. Colo. June 25, 2007).