The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held that a debtor’s interest in its liquor license constitutes property of the estate pursuant to section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The First Circuit further held that the debtor’s rejection of its lease ended the debtor’s contractual right to continued use of its liquor license, and left the landlord with ordinary remedies for breach of contract—such as specific performance to obtain recovery of the license. See In re Ground Round, Inc. (Abboud v. Ground Round), 482 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2007).

Lenders take note—a state court has held that in some circumstances a refinancing transaction can extinguish an original guarantee.

One week after Aegis Mortgage Corp. filed for chapter 11 in Delaware, a group of former employees filed their complaint seeking class certification over allegations that Aegis Mortgage Corporation, Aegis Wholesale Corporation and Cerberus Capital Management, L.P.—all allegedly acting as their employer—violated the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act when they failed to give over 400 employees 60 days' notice prior to a mass termination by Aegis Mortgage on August 7, 2007.

In Diamond Z Trailer, Inc. v. JZ, LLC (In re JZ, LLC), No. 07-1011 (9th Cir. B.A.P., June 18, 2007), the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed a Bankruptcy Court decision holding that an unscheduled executory contract rides through the bankruptcy if not assumed or rejected during the bankruptcy. Further, a debtor has standing to sue for a breach of that executory contract when the breach occurred after the closure of the bankruptcy case.

Another court ruling on a missed bar date highlights the importance of ensuring your rights are protected. Failure to comply with a deadline to file a claim can have catastrophic consequences.

Summary: As of July 1, 2007, Tennessee has a "new" statute on mechanics' and materialmen's liens. The new statute is the culmination of several years of effort on the part of a special committee of the Tennessee Bar Association (TBA). While the new statute replaces the old statute in its entirety, the new statute incorporates many of the provisions of the old statute. As a result, the new statute did not result in the drastic change in the law that the TBA committee originally envisioned.1

While the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provision in section 546(e) previously provided comfort for brokerdealers, the Bankruptcy Court’s decision in Gredd v. Bear, Stearns Securities Corp. (In re Manhattan Investment Fund, Ltd.), 359 B.R. 510 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), chips away at this provision and creates new risks for those providing brokerage account services. Always at risk as a deep pocket, new duties have been thrust upon brokerdealers that go far beyond the terms of the account agreement.

Factual Background

In In re Calpine Corporation, 2007 WL 685595 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York considered the issue of whether secured creditors whose debt was being paid prior to its original maturity date were entitled to a prepayment premium.

While derivations of intercreditor agreements continue to enhance the rights of the senior secured party, whether the many provisions provided for are enforceable in bankruptcy remains a burning question. Recently, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia in In re Aerosol Packaging, LLC, 2006 WL 4030176 (Bankr. N.D.Ga. 2006) helped bring clarity to one of the most important of these issues: is the right of a senior creditor to vote the claim of a junior creditor on whether to accept or reject a plan of reorganization enforceable in bankruptcy?

In Motorola, Inc. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007), the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”) and the debtors’ lenders sought approval of a settlement prior to confirmation of a plan of reorganization. While the Court concluded that many aspects of the settlement might otherwise be approved, it found that a provision that distributed funds in violation of the absolute priority rule lacked sufficient justification.