While derivations of intercreditor agreements continue to enhance the rights of the senior secured party, whether the many provisions provided for are enforceable in bankruptcy remains a burning question. Recently, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia in In re Aerosol Packaging, LLC, 2006 WL 4030176 (Bankr. N.D.Ga. 2006) helped bring clarity to one of the most important of these issues: is the right of a senior creditor to vote the claim of a junior creditor on whether to accept or reject a plan of reorganization enforceable in bankruptcy?

In Motorola, Inc. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007), the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”) and the debtors’ lenders sought approval of a settlement prior to confirmation of a plan of reorganization. While the Court concluded that many aspects of the settlement might otherwise be approved, it found that a provision that distributed funds in violation of the absolute priority rule lacked sufficient justification.

A federal district court in New York has overturned a bankruptcy court decision that some say had threatened to disrupt the secondary market in claims against companies in bankruptcy. See Enron Corp. v. Springfield Associates, L.L.C., No. 01-16034 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 27, 2007).

Another court ruling on a missed bar date highlights the importance of ensuring your rights are protected. Failure to comply with a deadline to file a claim can have catastrophic consequences.

Summary: As of July 1, 2007, Tennessee has a "new" statute on mechanics' and materialmen's liens. The new statute is the culmination of several years of effort on the part of a special committee of the Tennessee Bar Association (TBA). While the new statute replaces the old statute in its entirety, the new statute incorporates many of the provisions of the old statute. As a result, the new statute did not result in the drastic change in the law that the TBA committee originally envisioned.1

Decision determines that silica trust and channeling injunction are appropriate under Third Circuit standards.

On September 24, 2007, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania issued an opinion recommending confirmation of the Chapter 11 plans of North American Refractory Company (NARCO) and Global Industrial Technologies, Inc. (GIT). The decision caps a five-and-a-half-year reorganization for the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania-based family of industrial companies.

The decision of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Hutson v. Smithfield Packing Co. (In re National Gas Distributors, LLC)1 poses potentially serious problems for parties trading gas under the North American Energy Standards Board (NAESB) base contract. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit will soon review this case of first impression about what constitutes a “swap agreement” under the expanded definition included in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code after the 2005 amendments.

In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Halifax Fund, L.P. (In re Applied Theory Corp.),1 the Second Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, held that an official committee of unsecured creditors (the "Committee"), under the circumstances, did not have the right to commence an adversary proceeding seeking the equitable subordination of claims held by insiders of a Chapter 11 debtor. The Applied Theory court rebuffed the Committee's characterization of its claim as a direct claim that the Committee could prosecute without the bankruptcy court's permission.

In National Energy & Gas Transmission, Inc. v. Liberty Electric Power, LLC (In re National Energy & Gas Transmission, Inc.),1 the Fourth Circuit held that, where an unsecured creditor receives payment from a non-debtor guarantor in partial satisfaction of a claim against the debtor, for purposes of the creditor's claim against the debtor, the creditor may not choose to allocate such payment to post-petition interest.

According to a recent decision by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,1 a claim sold post-petition is not subject to equitable subordination based solely on the original claimholder's conduct. Likewise, a claim sold post-petition cannot be disallowed based on the original claimholder's receipt of (and failure to repay) an avoidable transfer.

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