On Friday, March 27, 2020, the U.S. House of Representatives voted to approve the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) submitted by the Senate and President Trump just signed the bill. The bill provides for $2.2 trillion in emergency aid to ease the financial impact of the COVID-19 crisis.

Indentures governing high yield and investment grade notes typically provide for a make-whole or other premium to be paid if the issuer redeems the underlying notes prior to maturity. The premiums are intended to compensate the investor for the loss of the bargained-for stream of income over a fixed period of time.[1] Generally, though, under New York law, a make-whole or other premium is not payable upon acceleration of notes after an event of default absent specific indenture language to the contrary.

On September 15, 2009, the United States Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York ordered Metavante Corporation (“Metavante”) to make payments to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (“LBSF”) under a prepetition interest rate swap agreement guaranteed by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI” and, together with LBSF, “Lehman”) after Metavante had suspended ordinary course settlement payments under the swap.1 Metavante claimed a contractual right to withhold payment under Section 2(a)(iii) of the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement as a result of Lehman’s bankruptcy.

The November/December 2007 issue of Insolvency Notes featured an article highlighting a Manhattan-based federal bankruptcy court's refusal to officially recognize proceedings commenced in the Cayman Islands to liquidate two Bear Stearns-managed hedge funds that collapsed in June of that year.

In National Energy & Gas Transmission, Inc. v. Liberty Electric Power, LLC (In re National Energy & Gas Transmission, Inc.),1 the Fourth Circuit held that, where an unsecured creditor receives payment from a non-debtor guarantor in partial satisfaction of a claim against the debtor, for purposes of the creditor's claim against the debtor, the creditor may not choose to allocate such payment to post-petition interest.

With cov-lite financings at record highs, debt holders will need to be proactive in maximising recoveries

Will the last person leaving please turn out the lites?

Cov-lite loans can leave lenders with limited restructuring options, but creative lenders will still find ways to bring debtors to the table, partners Ian Wallace and Christian Pilkington of global law firm White & Case LLP explain

For the past decade, shipping companies in every sector have faced continuing challenges from, among other things, declining demand, low charter rates, and an oversupply of new and more modern vessels. These factors have eroded second-hand vessel values and caused financial distress and insolvency for many shipping companies, requiring out of court financial restructurings and, in some cases, U.S. bankruptcy filings.

The recent ruling by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana in the Chapter 11 case of In re Yellowstone Mountain Club LLC 1 (“Yellowstone”), which found that a senior secured lender had engaged in “overreaching and predatory lending practices”, suggests an application of lender liability theory from today’s perspective to a transaction that took place before the credit crisis.  

Directors and officers of troubled companies are already keenly cognizant of their potential liability for any breaches of fiduciary duty, negligence and fraud.

In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Halifax Fund, L.P. (In re Applied Theory Corp.),1 the Second Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, held that an official committee of unsecured creditors (the "Committee"), under the circumstances, did not have the right to commence an adversary proceeding seeking the equitable subordination of claims held by insiders of a Chapter 11 debtor. The Applied Theory court rebuffed the Committee's characterization of its claim as a direct claim that the Committee could prosecute without the bankruptcy court's permission.