In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Baldwin (In re Lemington Home for the Aged), 659 F.3d 282 (3d Cir. 2011), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held, among other things, that the “deepening insolvency” cause of action, which the Third Circuit previously recognized in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2001), remains an independent cause of action under Pennsylvania law.

Background

On June 13, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC") released a final rule that, in most cases, will reduce the amount of pension benefits guaranteed under the agency's single-employer insurance program when a pension plan is terminated in a bankruptcy case. The rule will also decrease the amount of pension benefits given priority in bankruptcy.

When a company that has been designated a responsible party for environmental cleanup costs files for bankruptcy protection, the ramifications of the filing are not limited to a determination of whether the remediation costs are dischargeable claims. Another important issue is the circumstances under which contribution claims asserted by parties coliable with the debtor will be allowed or disallowed in the bankruptcy case. This question was the subject of rulings handed down early in 2011 by the New York bankruptcy court presiding over the chapter 11 cases of Lyondell Chemical Co.

The Bankruptcy Code treats insiders with increased scrutiny, from longer preference periods to rigorous equitable subordination principles, denial of chapter 7 trustee voting rights, disqualification in some cases of votes on a cram-down chapter 11 plan, and restrictions on postpetition key-employee compensation packages. The treatment of claims by insiders for prebankruptcy services is no exception to this general policy: section 502(b)(4) disallows insider claims for services to the extent the claim exceeds the "reasonable value" of such services.

In almost all large chapter 11 cases where a debtor leases significant amounts of real property, the debtor’s ability to assume or reject its unexpired leases plays a significant role in the restructuring of the debtor’s business operations.

A fundamental premise of chapter 11 is that a debtor’s prebankruptcy management is presumed to provide the most capable and dedicated leadership for the company and should be allowed to continue operating the company’s business and managing its assets in bankruptcy while devising a viable business plan or other workable exit strategy. The chapter 11 “debtor-in-possession” (“DIP ”) is a concept rooted strongly in modern U.S. bankruptcy jurisprudence. Still, the presumption can be overcome.

The U.S. Supreme Court has issued two bankruptcy rulings so far in 2007. On February 21, 2007, the Court ruled in Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts that a debtor who acts in bad faith in connection with filing a chapter 7 petition may forfeit the right to convert his case to a chapter 13 case. On March 20, 2007, the Court ruled in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.

In the March/April 2014 issue of Business Restructuring Review, we discussed a recent trend among bankruptcy courts in the Southern District of New York confirming chapter 11 plans containing provisions that treat the fees and expenses of unofficial committees or individual official committee members as administrative expenses without the need to demonstrate that the applicants made a “substantial contribution” to the estate, as required by sections 503(b)(3)(D) and 503(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re AMR Corp., 497 B.R. 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held in Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), 2013 BL 341634 (2d Cir. Dec. 11, 2013), that section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires a debtor "under this title" to have a domicile, a place of business, or property in the U.S., applies in cases under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The ability of a bankruptcy court to reorder the priority of claims or interests by means of equitable subordination or recharacterization of debt as equity is generally recognized. Even so, the Bankruptcy Code itself expressly authorizes only the former of these two remedies. Although common law uniformly acknowledges the power of a court to recast a claim asserted by a creditor as an equity interest in an appropriate case, the Bankruptcy Code is silent upon the availability of the remedy in a bankruptcy case.