Even before Congress added section 365(c)(3) to the Bankruptcy Code in 1984, it was generally understood that a nonresidential real property lease which has been validly terminated under applicable law prior to a bankruptcy filing by the debtor-former tenant cannot be assumed or assigned in bankruptcy. Moreover, the terminated leasehold interest is excluded from the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, and any action by the landlord to obtain possession of the formerly leased premises is not prohibited by the automatic stay.

The Situation: In the past few weeks, due to the severe impact of the COVID-19 crisis on non-essential businesses forced to close and terminate employees after filing for chapter 11 protection, bankruptcy courts have been confronted with requests by debtors to temporarily suspend their bankruptcy cases using the courts' equitable powers and a seldom-used provision of the Bankruptcy Code: 11 U.S.C. § 305(a).

The recent chapter 11 filings by PG&E Corp. and its Pacific Gas & Electric Co. utility subsidiary (collectively, "PG&E") and FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. have reignited the debate over the power of a U.S. bankruptcy court to authorize the rejection of contracts regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). Only a handful of courts have addressed this thorny issue to date, and with conflicting results in a controversy that may ultimately need to be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court or legislative action.

On May 16, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, No. 15-145, holding that the "actual fraud" bar to discharge under section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code encompasses an individual debtor's knowing receipt of fraudulently transferred property.

Statutory Background

In This Issue:

U.S. Supreme Court: Creditors May Immediately Appeal Denials of Automatic-Stay Relief

For nearly 25 years, courts in the Ninth Circuit have consistently refused to sanction nonconsensual third-party releases as part of chapter 11 plans. A ruling recently handed down by the U.S. District Court for the District of Washington reaffirms and extends that proposition. In In re Fraser’s Boiler Serv., Inc., 2019 WL 1099713 (D. Wash. Mar.

More than a decade after the enactment of chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, issues pertaining to recognition of a foreign debtor’s bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding under chapter 15 have, in large part, shifted from the purely procedural inquiry (such as the foreign debtor’s center of main interests, or “COMI”) to more substantive challenges regarding the limits, if any, that chapter 15 places on U.S. bankruptcy courts. But as demonstrated by the recent ruling in In re Creative Finance Ltd. (In Liquidation), 2016 BL 8825 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2016), U.S.

On July 16, 2014, the Uniform Law Commission (the "Commission") approved a series of amendments to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (the "UFTA"), which at that time was in force in 43 states (all states except Alaska, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, New York, South Carolina, and Virginia).

The ability of a bankruptcy trustee to avoid fraudulent or preferential transfers is a fundamental part of U.S. bankruptcy law. However, when an otherwise avoidable transfer by a U.S. entity takes place outside the U.S. to a non-U.S. transferee—as is increasingly common in the global economy—courts disagree as to whether the Bankruptcy Code’s avoidance provisions apply extraterritorially to avoid the transfer and recover the transferred assets. Several bankruptcy and appellate courts have addressed this issue in recent years, with inconsistent results.

A ruling recently handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit may provide significant flexibility to debtors in that circuit who are implementing sales of substantially all of their assets. In In re LCI Holding Company, Inc., 2015 BL 295784 (3d Cir. Sept.