In Trinity 83 Dev., LLC v. ColFin Midwest Funding, LLC, 917 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 2019), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code does not moot an appeal involving a dispute over the proceeds of a sale of assets in bankruptcy. In concluding that section 363(m) does not moot such an appeal, but merely provides the purchaser with a defense in litigation challenging the sale, the Seventh Circuit overruled its prior decision on the scope of section 363(m) in In re River West Plaza-Chicago, LLC, 664 F.3d 668 (7th Cir.

On June 13, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld lower court rulings declaring unconstitutional a 2014 Puerto Rico law, portions of which mirrored chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, that would have allowed the commonwealth’s public instrumentalities to restructure a significant portion of Puerto Rico’s bond debt (widely reported to be as much as $72 billion). In Commonwealth v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 2016 BL 187308 (U.S.

The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to use "cash collateral" during the course of a bankruptcy case may be vital to the debtor's prospects for a successful reorganization. However, because of the unique nature of cash collateral, the Bankruptcy Code sets forth special rules that apply to the nonconsensual use of such collateral to protect the interests of the secured creditor involved. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Washington examined these requirements in In re Claar Cellars, LLC, 2020 WL 1238924 (Bankr. E.D.

In In re Ultra Petroleum Corp., 913 F.3d 533 (5th Cir. 2019), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that a "make-whole," or "prepayment," premium owed on unsecured notes issued by a chapter 11 debtor constituted unmatured interest disallowed by section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. The ruling represents a landmark decision on the allowance of such premiums in chapter 11, over which there has been considerable litigation in recent years, including at the circuit court level.

Enforceability of Make-Whole Premiums in Bankruptcy

Even before Congress added section 365(c)(3) to the Bankruptcy Code in 1984, it was generally understood that a nonresidential real property lease which has been validly terminated under applicable law prior to a bankruptcy filing by the debtor-former tenant cannot be assumed or assigned in bankruptcy. Moreover, the terminated leasehold interest is excluded from the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, and any action by the landlord to obtain possession of the formerly leased premises is not prohibited by the automatic stay.

The Situation: In the past few weeks, due to the severe impact of the COVID-19 crisis on non-essential businesses forced to close and terminate employees after filing for chapter 11 protection, bankruptcy courts have been confronted with requests by debtors to temporarily suspend their bankruptcy cases using the courts' equitable powers and a seldom-used provision of the Bankruptcy Code: 11 U.S.C. § 305(a).

The recent chapter 11 filings by PG&E Corp. and its Pacific Gas & Electric Co. utility subsidiary (collectively, "PG&E") and FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. have reignited the debate over the power of a U.S. bankruptcy court to authorize the rejection of contracts regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). Only a handful of courts have addressed this thorny issue to date, and with conflicting results in a controversy that may ultimately need to be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court or legislative action.

On May 16, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, No. 15-145, holding that the "actual fraud" bar to discharge under section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code encompasses an individual debtor's knowing receipt of fraudulently transferred property.

Statutory Background

In a unanimous decision arising out of the Tribune Media Company bankruptcy cases, a panel of the Second Circuit held that the safe harbor under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which precludes avoidance of certain transfers by a

Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code acts as the Bankruptcy Code’s equitable backstop, empowering bankruptcy courts to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out [its] provisions” and to, “sua sponte, take[e] any action or mak[e] any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.” Does section 105(a), though, authorize