1. A crucial element to any scheme of arrangement is the question of how creditors are to be classed for voting purposes. In this regard, while the proper test for the classification of scheme creditors is well established, the increasing sophistication of restructuring deals have resulted in recent decisions that reveal finer aspects to the implementation of this test. This article explores the practical issues that appear to be arising with increasing frequency in relation to the composition of creditor classes. 

I. Introduction

1. Since 2017, Singapore has continually revamped and enhanced its corporate debt restructuring mechanisms. One of these enhancements is the introduction of the cross-class cramdown in Singapore’s Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (“IRDA”).

2. The cross-class cramdown is a powerful tool which is intended to prevent minority dissentients from blocking the passage of a scheme of arrangement. It can bind entire classes of dissenting creditors, as long as at least 1 class has voted in favour of the scheme, among other requirements.

In FamilyMart China Holding Co Ltd (Respondent) v Ting Chuan (Cayman Islands) Holding Corporation (Appellant) (Cayman Islands) [2023] UKPC 33, the Privy Council has provided useful guidance about the interplay between an arbitration agreement and exercise of the Cayman court’s powers and discretion to wind up a company on just and equitable grounds.

The Singapore High Court has again confirmed that a winding-up application concerning a disputed debt that is subject to an arbitration agreement will be dismissed if the arbitration agreement is prima facie valid and covers the dispute. This prima facie standard of review was first formulated three years ago by the Singapore Court of Appeal in AnAn Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Company) [2020] SCGA 33.

The rules governing corporate and personal insolvency in Singapore are set out in the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (IRDA), which includes mechanisms to reverse transactions that unfairly deplete a company's assets prior to insolvency, thereby protecting creditors' interests by allowing the value of the company’s assets to be maximised for distribution to its creditors on insolvency.

In the twelfth edition of the Going concerns, we cover set-offs and the net result of a creditor dealing with a company in liquidation; the first cross-border pre-pack scheme filed in the Singapore International Commercial Court ("SICC") by a foreign unregistered company that has been successfully sanctioned in Singapore: Re No Va Land Investment Group Corporation [2024] SGHC(I) 17 ("No Va Land"); and UAE's new bankruptcy law that came into effect on 1 May 2024, a relatively substantial overhaul of the onshore insolvency and restructuring regime in the UAE.

本稿では、近年のシンガポールの事業再生/倒産に関連する法・実務の発展を概観しつつ、シンガポール国際商事裁判所(以下｢SICC｣といいます。)における国際事業再生/倒産案件の取扱いについて解説します 。

1. 近年のシンガポール事業再生/倒産に関連する法・実務の発展

シンガポールは、様々なビジネス分野において東南アジア(又はグローバル)におけるハブを指向していますが(例えば、国際仲裁の分野において、シンガポール国際仲裁センター(SIAC)は国際仲裁機関として高い評価を得ています。)、事業再生/倒産の分野も例外ではありません。以下の年表からも分かるとおり、2010年代以降、政府・金融機関・実務家等が一丸となって、①グローバルスタンダードに合致し、かつ、国際倒産への対応も可能な倒産法制度を整備しつつ  、②シンガポールの裁判所を、東南アジアにおける国際事業再生/倒産案件のフォーラムとして確立しようとする動きが顕著に見られます 。

Insolvency set-off is an important quasi-security device for parties engaging in trade or other dealings with a company. It enables mutual debts owed between a party and a company to be set off against each other if the company goes into judicial management or liquidation.

Following an overhaul of the Singapore insolvency regime which came into force on 30 July 2020, the insolvency and restructuring framework was consolidated in the omnibus Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (IRDA). One of the key features of the IRDA was to amend the then-existing construct of statutory avoidance actions in Singapore.

Overview of statutory avoidance provisions following IRDA

In its recent judgement of Foo Kian Beng v OP3 International Pte. Ltd. [2024] SGCA 10, the Singapore Court of Appeal laid down some key principles regarding the scope of directors' duties to creditors, i.e. the "creditor duty". These principles serve as useful guidance not just for directors to understand how they should discharge their duties but also for creditors seeking to hold directors to account. We set out some practical guidance for creditors on ensuring that directors discharge the "creditor duty".

What does the "creditor duty" of directors encompass?