In recent opinions, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have revisited the doctrine of equitable subordination and have underscored the requirement that, before a court can equitably subordinate a creditor’s claim, the court must find that other creditors have been harmed by the actions of the creditor. Importantly, both decisions stress that equitable subordination is meant to be remedial and not punitive, and may not be imposed merely because a creditor has engaged in misconduct.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware has ruled that a creditor cannot effect a “triangular” setoff of the amounts owed between it and three affiliated debtors, despite pre-petition contracts that expressly contemplated multiparty setoff. In re SemCrude, L.P., Case No. 08-11525 (BLS), 2009 WL 68873 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 9, 2009). The Court relied principally on the plain language of section 553(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which limits setoff to mutual obligations between a debtor and a single nondebtor.

In Mission Product Holdings, the Supreme Court Endorses “Rejection-as-Breach” Rule and Interprets Broadly the Contract Rights that Survive Rejection

In the well-publicized opinion of In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC et al., 599 F. 3d 298 (3rd Cir. 2010), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, agreeing with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,1 held that Section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code)2 is unambiguous and is to be read in the disjunctive, thus allowing a proponent of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization to use the "cram down" power under subsection (iii) of that Section without allowing a secured creditor to credit bid on a sale proposed as part of the plan.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed in In re XMH Corp., 647 F. 3d 690 (7th Cir. 2011), whether or not trademark licenses are assignable in bankruptcy proceedings. In its ruling, the Court held that a trademark license may not be assigned by a licensee in a bankruptcy proceeding unless there is an express provision in the contract permitting assignment by the licensee.

“Section 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code [(“Code”)] and the doctrine of equitable recoupment entitled [a commercial tenant] to continue paying [reduced] rent … even after its landlord filed for bankruptcy and rejected the Lease,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on Nov. 30, 2018. In re Revel AC Inc., 2018 WL 6259316, *6 (3d Cir. Nov. 30, 2018).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s dismissal of a single asset real estate case on Jan. 19, 2012, reasoning that the debtor’s proposed substitute collateral “was not the indubitable equivalent of the [undersecured lender’s] mortgage.”In re River East Plaza, LLC, 2012 WL 169760, *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 19, 2012) (Posner, J.). In the court’s words, the debtor “wanted [the lender] out of there and decided to seek confirmation of a [reorganization] plan . . .

“The right of setoff … allows entities to apply their mutual debts against each other to avoid the pointless exercise of ‘making A pay B when B owes A.’” held the Seventh Circuit on Aug. 17, 2018. Berg v. Social Security Administration, 900 F.3d 864, 868 (7th Cir. 2018). But the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) limits “a creditor’s right of setoff during the ninety-day period prior to the” date of bankruptcy, said the court. Id.

On June 28, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that secured creditors have a statutory right to credit bid1 their debt at an asset sale conducted under a "cramdown" plan. In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, ___ F.3d. ___, 2011 WL 2547615 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011).2 The Seventh Circuit's decision creates a split with recent decisions in the Third and Fifth Circuits regarding a lender's ability to credit bid its secured debt. See In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Pacific Lumber, Co., 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.

A bankruptcy court properly dismissed a creditor’s involuntary bankruptcy petition “for cause” when it “would serve none of the Bankruptcy Code’s goals or purposes . . . and [when] the sole [petitioning] creditor is not substantially prejudiced by remedies available under state law,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on Aug. 14, 2018. In re Murray, 2018 WL 3848316, *7 (2d Cir. Aug. 14, 2018). In its view, the bankruptcy court “declined to serve as a ‘rented battle field’ or ‘collection agency’” for a single creditor. Id., at *7.