The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, on Feb. 14, 2013, held that an insider of a Chapter 11 partnership debtor cannot avoid the “competition rule” in a new-value reorganization plan. The debtor’s equity owner arranged for his wife, also an “insider,” to contribute new value to obtain the equity of the reorganized debtor. In re Castleton Plaza, LP, — F.3d –––, 2013 WL 537269 at *1 (7th Cir., Feb. 14, 2013).
On May 20, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a ruling of key significance for trademark licensing and for acquisitions, investments, financings and other transactions in which trademark licenses are a key value driver. In Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC,[1] the Court held, 8-1, that where the licensor of a trademark rejects a trademark license in bankruptcy, the rejection does not deprive the licensee of its rights to use the licensed trademark(s).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held on July 9 that the nondebtor licensee of a rejected trademark license may continue to use the trademark (Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Mfg., LLC, ___ F.3d ___, 2012 WL 2687939 (7th Cir. July 9, 2012) (Easterbrook, Ch. J.)). The court's clear, concise and no-nonsense opinion explained that Bankruptcy Code ("Code") § 365(g) deems a trustee's rejection to be a "breach" of the contract, enabling "the other party's rights [to] remain in place." Id., at *3.
“Section 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code [(“Code”)] and the doctrine of equitable recoupment entitled [a commercial tenant] to continue paying [reduced] rent … even after its landlord filed for bankruptcy and rejected the Lease,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on Nov. 30, 2018. In re Revel AC Inc., 2018 WL 6259316, *6 (3d Cir. Nov. 30, 2018).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s dismissal of a single asset real estate case on Jan. 19, 2012, reasoning that the debtor’s proposed substitute collateral “was not the indubitable equivalent of the [undersecured lender’s] mortgage.”In re River East Plaza, LLC, 2012 WL 169760, *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 19, 2012) (Posner, J.). In the court’s words, the debtor “wanted [the lender] out of there and decided to seek confirmation of a [reorganization] plan . . .
“The right of setoff … allows entities to apply their mutual debts against each other to avoid the pointless exercise of ‘making A pay B when B owes A.’” held the Seventh Circuit on Aug. 17, 2018. Berg v. Social Security Administration, 900 F.3d 864, 868 (7th Cir. 2018). But the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) limits “a creditor’s right of setoff during the ninety-day period prior to the” date of bankruptcy, said the court. Id.
On June 28, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that secured creditors have a statutory right to credit bid1 their debt at an asset sale conducted under a "cramdown" plan. In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, ___ F.3d. ___, 2011 WL 2547615 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011).2 The Seventh Circuit's decision creates a split with recent decisions in the Third and Fifth Circuits regarding a lender's ability to credit bid its secured debt. See In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Pacific Lumber, Co., 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.
A bankruptcy court properly dismissed a creditor’s involuntary bankruptcy petition “for cause” when it “would serve none of the Bankruptcy Code’s goals or purposes . . . and [when] the sole [petitioning] creditor is not substantially prejudiced by remedies available under state law,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on Aug. 14, 2018. In re Murray, 2018 WL 3848316, *7 (2d Cir. Aug. 14, 2018). In its view, the bankruptcy court “declined to serve as a ‘rented battle field’ or ‘collection agency’” for a single creditor. Id., at *7.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s ruling that a debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) lender had breached its financing agreement, barring its claim for commitment and funding fees from the DIP. Arlington LF, LLC v. Arlington Hospitality, Inc., No. 09-3560, 2011 WL 727981, *9 (7th Cir. March 3, 2011), aff’g No. 08 C 5098, 2011 WL 3055350 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2009). Although the DIP itself had also breached the agreement, that breach was not, in the court’s view, effective until after the lender had already “walked away.” Id. at *6.
A purported conditional sale agreement “created a security interest rather than a lease,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on Aug. 7, 2018. In re Pioneer Health Services Inc., 2018 WL 3747537, *3 (5th Cir. Aug. 7, 2018). Affirming the lower courts’ finding “that the relevant agreements were not ‘true leases,’” the court rejected a bank’s “motion to compel payment under [its] contract as an unexpired lease or an administrative expense.” Id., at *1. The economic substance, not the form of the transaction, was decisive.