Even before Congress added section 365(c)(3) to the Bankruptcy Code in 1984, it was generally understood that a nonresidential real property lease which has been validly terminated under applicable law prior to a bankruptcy filing by the debtor-former tenant cannot be assumed or assigned in bankruptcy. Moreover, the terminated leasehold interest is excluded from the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, and any action by the landlord to obtain possession of the formerly leased premises is not prohibited by the automatic stay.

It is often said that fools and their money are soon parted. In this regard, the former owners of a debtor who used the debtor’s funds to gamble at the Horseshoe Casino (the “Casino”), ultimately losing over $8 million dollars, could aptly be considered fools.

It’s hard to believe, but until now, the Seventh Circuit has never weighed in on the issue of when a claim arises in a bankruptcy case.  As a result, the Seventh Circuit has had the luxury of sitting back, watching the Third Circuit go from Frenville to 

Attorney.  Counselor.  Advisor.  As “the last bastion of the generalist,” the role of the restructuring attorney takes various forms and requires a restructuring attorney to wear many different hats – at times acting both as lawyer and business advisor.  This combination of business and law is very often what draws professionals to the practice area in the first place.  The line, however, between business and legal advisor is often blurry and imprecise, and a recent 

In the recent decision William R. Lee Irrevocable Trust v. Lee (In re Lee), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision (also affirmed by the district court) piercing a non-debtor’s corporate veil and allowing a creditor of the non-debtor to participate in the bankruptcy of the corporation’s individual shareholder.

Yesterday, the United States Supreme Court, in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., Case No. 16-784, ruled that the “securities safe harbor” under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, does not shield transferees from liability simply because a particular transaction was routed through a financial intermediary—so-called “conduit transactions.”

We’ve previously commented on this blog on a number of decisions (see: (i) Too Little, Too Late: Ninth Circuit Holds Confirmation Objection Insufficient to Revive Untimely Complaint Objecting to Dischargeability of Debt, (ii)

The avoidance powers contained in chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code permit the recovery of certain prepetition “transfers” made by the debtor – either as a preference under section 547 or as a fraudulent transfer under either section 548 or state common law, made applicable under section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Typically, the “tran

Yesterday’s post discussed the recent appellate ruling in Sentinel’s bankruptcy, Grede v. Bank of New York Mellon Corp.

In the latest ruling in the long-running dispute in Sentinel Management’s bankruptcy case, the Seventh Circuit recently held that a bank employee’s suspicions about the source of the bank’s collateral should have put the bank on inquiry notice, thus precluding the bank from asserting a “good faith” defense to a fraudulent transfer claim that a liquidating trustee brought against the bank.