Not necessarily so, according to the recent rulings of Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Judge Allan Gropper in the US$27 billion General Growth Properties Chapter 11 bankruptcy—at least with respect to the issue of substantive consolidation.
Borrowers, agent banks, syndicate members and secondary market purchasers incur, syndicate, sell and buy bank debt on the assumption that bank debt is not a “security.” However, a June 30, 2016, opinion in the General Motors preference litigation1shows that such an assumption may no longer be valid, at least under the Bankruptcy Code.
Changes to Hungarian bankruptcy law mean that priority will be given to creditors who pledge property as security or collateral. Minor changes to Hungarian corporate legislation require companies to list specific court registration information on their official correspondence and websites.
Introduction
I. Summary
Last month, in a significant ruling in the General Growth Properties, Inc. (“GGP”) bankruptcy case, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York denied motions to dismiss, as bad faith filings, the bankruptcy cases of 20 purported bankruptcyremote special purpose entity (“SPE”) subsidiary debtors.1
Introduction
In a recent decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York found that the Statutory Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”) of Iridium, a failed Motorola spin-off venture, was unable to prove that Iridium was insolvent or had unreasonably small capital during the four-year period prior to commencement of its bankruptcy case.
A New York bankruptcy court, on Dec. 12, 2013, issued a 166-page decision after a 34-day trial, concluding that the spin-off of a highly profitable energy business constituted a fraudulent transfer intended to shield the business from massive environmental liabilities, and awarding damages of up to approximately $14.5 billion.[1]Tronox Inc. et al. v. Kerr McGee et al. (In re Tronox et al.) (Bankruptcy S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2013) (J.
DURING THE PAST YEAR, many investors in the distressed debt market have received postreorganization private equity1 either through a confirmed plan of reorganization or through participation in a rights offering. Unlike publicly traded equity, each new issuance of postreorganization equity leaves recipients, issuers, and agents potentially facing uncharted territory in terms of how the instrument is to trade and settle.
After holding a hearing on the topic this past July, the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) released a report earlier this week entitled, “The Use of TARP Funds in Support and Reorganization of the Domestic Automotive Industry,” examining how TARP funds have been used to support and reorganize both