One of the most significant changes to chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the 2005 amendments was the absolute limit placed on extensions of the exclusivity periods. Courts no longer have the discretion to extend a debtor’s exclusive periods to file and solicit a plan beyond 18 months and 20 months, respectively, after the petition date. Although the legislative history contains no explanation for why this change was made, Congress presumably intended to accelerate the reorganization process or facilitate the prospects for competing plans in large, complex cases.
On March 15, 2007, with Jones Day’s assistance as bankruptcy counsel, FLYi, Inc. (“FLYi”), Independence Air, Inc. (“Independence”) and their affiliated debtors (collectively, the “Debtors”) obtained confirmation of their chapter 11 plan under the “cramdown” provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The plan, which become effective on March 30, 2007, will distribute approximately $150 million to unsecured creditors. In ruling on confirmation of the plan, the U.S.
The ability to borrow money during the course of a bankruptcy case is an important tool available to a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession (“DIP”). Often times, the debtor’s most logical choice for a lender is one with an existing pre-bankruptcy relationship with the debtor. As a condition to making new loans, however, lenders commonly require the debtor to waive its right to pursue avoidance or lender liability actions against the lender based upon pre-bankruptcy events.
On April 18, 2007, in Fla. Dep’t. of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (In re Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.),1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the stamp tax exemption of 11 USC § 1146(c)2 may apply to transfers of assets that were necessary to the consummation of a bankruptcy plan of reorganization and were made prior to confirmation of the plan. In reaching this decision, the Eleventh Circuit declined to follow decisions of the Third and Fourth Circuits to the contrary and thus created a split among the circuits on this issue.
The strategic importance of classifying claims and interests under a chapter 11 plan is sometimes an invitation for creative machinations designed to muster adequate support for confirmation of the plan. Although the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally states that only “substantially similar” claims or interests can be classified together, it neither defines “substantial similarity” nor requires that all claims or interests fitting the description be classified together.
The ability to sell assets during the course of a chapter 11 case without incurring transfer taxes customarily levied on such transactions outside of bankruptcy often figures prominently in a potential debtor’s strategic bankruptcy planning. However, the circumstances under which a sale and related transactions (e.g., recording of mortgages) qualify for the tax exemption have been a focal point of dispute for many courts, including no less than four circuit courts of appeal.
Recently, a New York state court gave the New York Liquidation Bureau ("NYLB") permission to notify more than 300,000 creditors of Union Indemnity Insurance Company (“Union Indemnity”) that it plans to make the first distribution from the insolvent property casualty insurer's estate. See In Re Union Indemnity Ins. Co., No. 41292/85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Oct. 10, 2007).
In an adversary proceeding brought by a liquidating company to determine the availability of coverage under the debtor's insurance policies, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware has held that the insolvency of an underlying insurer did not affect an excess carrier's obligation for claims within its own layer of coverage. In re Integrated Health Services, Inc., 2007 WL 2687593 (D. Del. Sept. 12, 2007). Although the adversary proceeding was initially filed in bankruptcy court, it was consensually withdrawn to the district court.
In a case involving a bankruptcy reorganization in which a trustee in bankruptcy was given the right to pursue claims of misappropriation or infringement (but not ownership of the bankrupt’s intellectual property), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district court finding that the no trustee had standing to bring suit. Morrow, et al. v. Microsoft Corp., Case Nos. 06-1512, -1518, -1537 (Fed. Cir., Sept. 19, 2007 (Moore, J.; Prost, J., dissenting).
The Delaware Supreme Court has affirmed, without opinion, a ruling by a lower court that ‘deepening insolvency’ is not a cause of action under Delaware law. Trenwick America Litig. Trust v. Billett, 931 A.2d 438 (Del. 2007).
The ruling appears to be the strongest nail yet in the coffin of so-called “deepening insolvency” actions.