“In bankruptcy, as in life, timing can be everything” – the Fifth Circuit.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts has denied injunctive relief requested by two bankruptcy trustees seeking to stay the prosecution and settlement of shareholder actions proceeding against various former officers and directors of a bankrupt corporation. In re Enivid, 2007 WL 806627 (Bankr. D. Mass. Mar. 16, 2007).
In a recent decision, Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts1, the United States Supreme Court considered whether a debtor has an absolute right under Section 706(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to convert a case to Chapter 13, clarifying a growing split among circuits as to whether the debtor’s bad faith conduct prior to his proposed conversion results in the forfeiture of the debtor’s right to convert.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held that a bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction to hear a chapter 11 debtor's breach of contract and tortious interference claims, which the debtor filed after its chapter 11 plan had been confirmed and substantially consummated. Valley Historic Limited Partnership v. Bank of New York, No. 06-1571,___ F.3d ___, WL 1439734 (4th Cir. May 17, 2007). This decision delineates the limits of bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over claims filed by the debtor after plan confirmation.
Background
One of the most significant changes to chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the 2005 amendments was the absolute limit placed on extensions of the exclusivity periods. Courts no longer have the discretion to extend a debtor’s exclusive periods to file and solicit a plan beyond 18 months and 20 months, respectively, after the petition date. Although the legislative history contains no explanation for why this change was made, Congress presumably intended to accelerate the reorganization process or facilitate the prospects for competing plans in large, complex cases.
On March 15, 2007, with Jones Day’s assistance as bankruptcy counsel, FLYi, Inc. (“FLYi”), Independence Air, Inc. (“Independence”) and their affiliated debtors (collectively, the “Debtors”) obtained confirmation of their chapter 11 plan under the “cramdown” provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The plan, which become effective on March 30, 2007, will distribute approximately $150 million to unsecured creditors. In ruling on confirmation of the plan, the U.S.
The ability to borrow money during the course of a bankruptcy case is an important tool available to a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession (“DIP”). Often times, the debtor’s most logical choice for a lender is one with an existing pre-bankruptcy relationship with the debtor. As a condition to making new loans, however, lenders commonly require the debtor to waive its right to pursue avoidance or lender liability actions against the lender based upon pre-bankruptcy events.
“Give ups” by senior classes of creditors to achieve confirmation of a plan have become an increasingly common feature of the chapter 11 process, as stakeholders strive to avoid disputes that can prolong the bankruptcy case and drain estate assets by driving up administrative costs.
On April 18, 2007, in Fla. Dep’t. of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (In re Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.),1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the stamp tax exemption of 11 USC § 1146(c)2 may apply to transfers of assets that were necessary to the consummation of a bankruptcy plan of reorganization and were made prior to confirmation of the plan. In reaching this decision, the Eleventh Circuit declined to follow decisions of the Third and Fourth Circuits to the contrary and thus created a split among the circuits on this issue.
The strategic importance of classifying claims and interests under a chapter 11 plan is sometimes an invitation for creative machinations designed to muster adequate support for confirmation of the plan. Although the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally states that only “substantially similar” claims or interests can be classified together, it neither defines “substantial similarity” nor requires that all claims or interests fitting the description be classified together.