Valuation is a critical and indispensable part of the bankruptcy process. How collateral and other estate assets (and even creditor claims) are valued will determine a wide range of issues, from a secured creditor’s right to adequate protection, post-petition interest, or relief from the automatic stay to a proposed chapter 11 plan’s satisfaction of the “best interests” test or whether a “cram-down” plan can be confirmed despite the objections of dissenting creditors.

On March 26, 2008, the United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case of State of Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. to consider the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's ruling that a bankruptcy court may exempt certain state and local taxes in a sale approved prior to confirmation of a chapter 11 plan under § 1146(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Introduction

Section 1146(a) (formerly, and for the purposes of this case § 1146(c)) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:

Customers dealing with troubled automotive suppliers often decide to resource production to other suppliers rather than facilitate a true restructuring of the troubled supplier's business. Such resourcing, however, generally cannot be done overnight. Tier 1 suppliers or original equipment manufacturers ("OEMs") often take months to resource production. Because of the "just in time" production process, Tier 1 suppliers and OEMs often cannot afford to be without component parts or tooling for the period of time that it may take to resource.

The New Hampshire Supreme Court will hear oral argument on April 30, 2008, in In the matter of the Liquidation of The Home Ins. Co., No. 2007-0794, N.H.), to consider whether the Superior Court erred in ruling that the a setoff claimed by Century Indemnity Company (“CIC”) lacked the mutuality necessary to trigger setoff under the New Hampshire Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act (the “Liquidation Act”).

A recent bankruptcy court ruling is a reminder that bank accounts established for certain specific purposes may not be subject to general setoff rights.

Section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code preserves a creditor’s right of setoff under the Bankruptcy Code. To exercise this right, “mutuality” must exist—i.e., the debtor must owe an obligation to the creditor and the creditor a corresponding obligation to the debtor. Normally a straightforward analysis, determining whether mutuality is present becomes more difficult when there are more than two parties.

With the possibility of a major stock brokerage liquidation appearing more likely than it has been in recent periods, the effect of a liquidation on customers and financial counterparties has become of great interest to many of our clients and others.

When an insurer becomes insolvent and is placed in rehabilitation or liquidation, state insurance laws are very clear that reinsurance proceeds owed by the insolvent insurer’s various reinsurers may not be denied or reduced as a result of the insolvency. The insurer’s policyholders, however, may only look to the estate of the insurer for payment of claims. But, what happens in a situation where the insolvent insurer never took on any risk but merely acted as a fronting carrier for the reinsurer?

If you thought, like many, that the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billet, 2007 Del. LEXIS 357 (Del. 2007), put the theory of “deepening insolvency” to rest, once and for all, well, think again. A recent decision, George L. Miller v. McCown De Leeuw & Co. (In re The Brown Schools), 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 1226 (Bankr. D. Del. April 24, 2008), from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware shows that “deepening insolvency” endures, albeit in reduced form.

Introduction

In Oneida Ltd. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (In re Oneida Ltd.),1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York addressed whether a premium payment created by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (“DRA”)2 for pension plans terminated as part of a chapter 11 restructuring is a pre-petition claim or a post-petition administrative expense. The Court held that the statutorily mandated premium payment was a contingent pre-petition claim and was discharged upon confirmation of the debtor’s plan.

Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that claims for “damages arising from the purchase or sale of . . . a security” of the debtor or an affiliate of the debtor are subordinated to any claims not based on stock. 11 U.S.C. § 510(b). Because there is rarely enough value in a bankrupt company to satisfy all claims, a determination that a particular claim is subject to mandatory subordination under section 510(b) means that, as a practical matter, the claim is unlikely to receive any distribution from the estate.