On February 11th, the three private plaintiff-appellants and eleven State plaintiff-appellants in State National Bank of Big Spring, et al. v. Jacob J. Lew, et al. filed briefs with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in their appeal of the District Court’s decision that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (the “Dodd-Frank Act” or the “Act”).

On Feb. 11, the three private plaintiff- appellants and 11 state plaintiff-appellants in State National Bank of Big Spring et al. v. Jacob J. Lew et al. filed briefs with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in their appeal of the district court’s decision that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).

In another judicial decision springing from Lehman Brothers, as a result of the likely surplus in the estate of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) (LBIE) after all the provable debts have been paid, Mr Justice Richards has issued a ‘statement of conclusions’ in what is called the Waterfall Application. A more detailed judgement is expected in late March 2014. We summarise the conclusions below.

Ranking and Contributions of Shareholders of Inlimited Companies

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held in Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), 2013 BL 341634 (2d Cir. Dec. 11, 2013), that section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires a debtor "under this title" to have a domicile, a place of business, or property in the U.S., applies in cases under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Not-for-profit entities are not immune from the business cycles, risk of lawsuits and other threats to solvency. Managing the collapse of an organization has always required diligence, but recent IRS enforcement initiatives and a recent District Court decision have made these situations even more troublesome. During the wind-down of a failed organization, there has generally been no personal liability for managers who have chosen to pay some vendors over others (except for certain limited statutory exceptions such as trust fund taxes).

Reliance Insurance Company was placed in liquidation on Oct. 3, 2001 by Order of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. The Reliance liquidation was, and still is, one of the largest insurance company liquidations in U.S. history. Reliance has been in the process of marshaling assets and paying its liabilities for the past 12 years through a court-appointed Liquidator, namely the Insurance Commissioner of Pennsylvania.

When does the life of a Delaware corporation end? Not as long as there are third-party claimants with claims to assert and undistributed assets available to satisfy them. In Anderson v. Krafft-Murphy, No. 85, 2013 (Del. Nov. 26, 2013), asbestos tort claimants in lawsuits pending in other jurisdictions against Krafft-Murphy Co., a dissolved Delaware corporation, sought the appointment of a receiver to enable them to lawfully pursue their claims against the corporation in those other courts beyond the statutory three-year winding-up period.

The Bottom Line:

In Michigan State Housing Development Authority v. Lehman Brothers Derivatives Products, Inc., et al. (In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al.) (Michigan State Housing), 1 the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the Bankruptcy Court) recently held that a provision in a swap agreement that shifted the methodology for calculating termination amounts upon the debtor counterparty’s bankruptcy was enforceable under the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor for liquidating, terminating and accelerating swap agreements.

In determining their preference liability exposure, creditors typically consider whether they have provided any subsequent “new value” to the debtor after they have received an alleged preferential payment. Debtors and trustees frequently take the position that creditors cannot use as a defense any new value that has been repaid to the creditor post-petition through critical vendor payments or pursuant to Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy courts have ruled differently on this issue.