A husband and wife jointly owned their property. In matrimonial proceedings, the husband was ordered to transfer his interest in the property to the wife. Following his bankruptcy, the husband’s trustee applied to set aside the property transfer on the basis that it had been made at an undervalue, and the wife had given no consideration in money or money’s worth within the meaning of s339 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The wife contended that the fact that she had foregone ancillary relief claims was capable of amounting to consideration.

MB had been the secured tenant of a property in which she lived with B, and which she had bought at a substantial discount. The property was conveyed into the joint names of MB and B as joint tenants. Although MB’s mortgage company had insisted the property be in joint names, she claimed that the intention had always been that B would only have a minimal interest in it. He had made no contribution to the purchase price, mortgage repayments or household expenses. When MB had ascertained the effect of the joint tenancy, she gave notice of severance to B.

The company, through its receivers, brought and prosecuted an unsuccessful claim against the defendants. The claim was financed from funds subject to the receivers’ control but the receivers had no beneficial or personal interest in those funds or the outcome of the proceedings. The first defendant sought to recover his costs of the proceedings from the receivers from funds realised in the course of the receivership on the basis that they were the real claimants, and had conducted the proceedings for the benefit of themselves and the bank that had appointed them.

Lamington Road Designated Activity Company LLC (Case No. 18-12615) and its subsidiary, White Eagle General Partner, LLC (Case No.

In a recent opinion dated March 29, 2016, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court on remand from, and following the direction of, the Delaware District Court, ruled that only prepetition unpaid invoices may be counted for purposes of the new value defense under 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4). The Bankruptcy Court also ruled that the plaintiff Chapter 7 trustee was entitled to prejudgment interest from the date of the filing of the preference avoidance complaint. Further, the District Court, in affirming the Bankruptcy Court on this point, addressed the ordinary course defense under 11 U.S.C.

A lender’s entitlement to a make-whole premium, that is, a prepayment penalty designed to compensate the lender for the loss of interest payments it would have received had the borrower continued to service the debt through the maturity date of the loan, depends principally on the plain language of the bond indenture or credit agreement.  See, e.g.,HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Calpine Corp. (In re Calpine Corp.),No. 07 Civ 3088 (GBD), 2010 WL 3835200, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.

On 29 October 2018, HM Treasury published a consultation paper on a breathing space scheme and a statutory debt repayment plan, which were both part of the government’s 2017 manifesto commitments.

This edition of Global Insight comes to you shortly after the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on Jan. 27, 2014 that a lender’s acceleration due to a borrower’s payment default did not trigger a prepayment premium. In re Denver Merchandise Mart, Inc., 2014 WL 291920, *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 2014) (“Denver Merchandise”). Affirming the lower courts’ application of state law, the court held that “the plain language of the contract does not require the payment of the Prepayment Consideration in the event of mere acceleration.” Id. at *5.  

Relevance

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held on Feb. 3, 2009, that a debtor’s “strategic partnership” vendor was liable as a non-statutory insider for preferential payments it received approximately four months prior to the debtor’s bankruptcy. In re Winstar Communications, Inc., ___F.3d ___, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1953, at *1 (3d Cir. 2/3/09). The court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s judgment (an 88-page decision with detailed fact findings), rendered after a 21-day bench trial that included 1,400 exhibits and 39 witnesses.