A trustee in bankruptcy applied for an order for sale of a property owned jointly by the bankrupt and his wife, the claimant. The claimant, who suffered chronic ill health, resided in the property. She also jointly owned another property with her brother, and in order to suspend orders for possession and sale of the matrimonial property, offered charges over that other property. This was not accepted by the trustee on the basis that the husband’s creditors would be unlikely to receive payment in the near future.

The court has held that a statutory demand is valid despite the high default interest rate on an underlying loan.

The claimant appealed against a decision that her former husband’s one third interest in the matrimonial home vested in his trustee in bankruptcy (the first defendant) free from any rights asserted by her, so permitting an order for possession and sale of the property. The claimant argued that pursuant to a matrimonial consent order made prior to the bankruptcy, she had a right of exclusive occupation of the property until remarriage, cohabitation or death.

Lamington Road Designated Activity Company LLC (Case No. 18-12615) and its subsidiary, White Eagle General Partner, LLC (Case No.

In a recent opinion dated March 29, 2016, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court on remand from, and following the direction of, the Delaware District Court, ruled that only prepetition unpaid invoices may be counted for purposes of the new value defense under 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4). The Bankruptcy Court also ruled that the plaintiff Chapter 7 trustee was entitled to prejudgment interest from the date of the filing of the preference avoidance complaint. Further, the District Court, in affirming the Bankruptcy Court on this point, addressed the ordinary course defense under 11 U.S.C.

A lender’s entitlement to a make-whole premium, that is, a prepayment penalty designed to compensate the lender for the loss of interest payments it would have received had the borrower continued to service the debt through the maturity date of the loan, depends principally on the plain language of the bond indenture or credit agreement.  See, e.g.,HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Calpine Corp. (In re Calpine Corp.),No. 07 Civ 3088 (GBD), 2010 WL 3835200, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.

On 29 October 2018, HM Treasury published a consultation paper on a breathing space scheme and a statutory debt repayment plan, which were both part of the government’s 2017 manifesto commitments.

This edition of Global Insight comes to you shortly after the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held on June 23, 2011, that junior creditors could receive a distribution over the objection of senior creditors who claimed they were entitled to post-petition interest under contractual subordination provisions. In re Bank of New England Corporation, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 2476470 (1st Cir. June 23, 2011). In reaching its decision, based on the bankruptcy court's fact findings, the court stressed "that the parties did not intend to subordinate the Junior Noteholders to post-petition interest."Id. at *5.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently awarded an oversecured lender post-petition interest on the full amount of its secured claim at the default rate set forth in the lender’s contract (19%) plus compound (PIK) interest up to the aggregate rate of 25% (the maximum rate allowable under New York State usury laws). In re Urban Communicators PCS Limited Partnership, et al., 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4062 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 12/11/07) (Gerber, B.J.).