On Jan. 25, 2010, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) held that a trust deed provision reversing a priority of payment waterfall upon the bankruptcy of a credit support provider under a swap agreement is unenforceable under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”).

A court-approved pre-plan settlement that would have resolved a dispute between a Chapter 11 creditors’ committee and the debtor’s secured lenders over the lenders’ liens was vacated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on March 5. Motorola, Inc. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors and J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Iridium Operating LLC). The settlement also would have funded massive litigation against the debtor’s former parent, Motorola Inc.

Motorola’s Successful Argument

In a Jan. 20, 2010, opinion, Judge Christopher S. Sontchi of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that a group of investors who had together proposed a plan of reorganization for the debtor did not have to comply with the disclosure requirements of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2019 (“Rule 2019”) In re Premier International Holdings, Inc., No. 09-12019 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 20, 2010) (Sontchi, J.) (“Six Flags”). In Six Flags, Judge Sontchi expressly disagreed with two prior decisions on the subject of Rule 2019 disclosure, one by Judge Mary K.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held on Nov. 3, 2009, that a district court had improperly dismissed, on mootness grounds, an appeal from a bankruptcy court’s order confirming a reorganization plan. According to the Tenth Circuit, the appeal was reviewable because reversal of the plan confirmation order (1) would not unduly affect innocent third parties, and (2) would not undo any complex transactions.

In a decision to be hailed by buyers of distressed debt and bankruptcy claims on the secondary loan market, on Oct. 15, 2009, the New York Court of Appeals (the “Court”), in a fact-specific ruling, held that an assignment of claim does not violate New York’s champerty statute (forbidding trading in litigation claims) if the purpose of the assignment is to collect damages by means of a lawsuit for losses on a debt instrument in which the assignee holds a pre-existing proprietary interest. Trust for the Certificate Holders of the Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc.

Insider creditors “waived [the] right to charge default interest on” their claims and “failed to prove” their claim for non-default interest, held the U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Tenth Circuit (“BAP”) on Nov. 6, 2015. In re Autterson, 2015 WL 6789168, at *4 (10th Cir. BAP, Nov. 6, 2015).

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York entered an order on Sept. 17, 2009, granting a motion filed by Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (“LBSF”) to compel Metavante Corporation (“Metavante”) to continue to make payments to LBSF under an ISDA Master Agreement.

A Chapter 11 debtor’s reorganization plan purporting to cure a default under a pre-bankruptcy loan agreement must pay “the agreed-upon default rate interest,” consistent with “the underlying agreement” and the “applicable nonbankruptcy law,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on Aug. 31, 2015. In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 2015 WL 5091909, at *4 (11th Cir. Aug. 31, 2015).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held on May 5, 2009, that a group of secured lenders were fully secured and “entitled to a full recovery” from the debtor despite the bankruptcy court’s improper valuation of the collateral (improved airport terminal space) securing the lenders’ underlying $60 million loan. In re United Airlines, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 9648 (7th Cir. 5/5/09) (Easterbrook, Ch. J.). The lower courts had valued the lenders’ collateral at $35 million, leaving them with a $25 million unsecured claim.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on Jan. 27, 2014 that a lender’s acceleration due to a borrower’s payment default did not trigger a prepayment premium. In re Denver Merchandise Mart, Inc., 2014 WL 291920, *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 2014) (“Denver Merchandise”). Affirming the lower courts’ application of state law, the court held that “the plain language of the contract does not require the payment of the Prepayment Consideration in the event of mere acceleration.” Id. at *5.  

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