2002 was a seminal year for restructuring and insolvency professionals in the U.K. In November of that year, the eagerly anticipated Enterprise Act of 2002, which was intended to lay the statutory foundations for the “rescue culture,” received royal assent. Six months earlier, with considerably less fanfare, the EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (EC No. 1346/2000) (the “Regulation”) was introduced throughout the EU (except Denmark). A clear understanding of how these twin pieces of law operate is crucial when reviewing a stakeholder’s options once a company becomes distressed.

On March 15, 2007, with Jones Day’s assistance as bankruptcy counsel, FLYi, Inc. (“FLYi”), Independence Air, Inc. (“Independence”) and their affiliated debtors (collectively, the “Debtors”) obtained confirmation of their chapter 11 plan under the “cramdown” provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The plan, which become effective on March 30, 2007, will distribute approximately $150 million to unsecured creditors. In ruling on confirmation of the plan, the U.S.

One of the most significant changes to chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the 2005 amendments was the absolute limit placed on extensions of the exclusivity periods. Courts no longer have the discretion to extend a debtor’s exclusive periods to file and solicit a plan beyond 18 months and 20 months, respectively, after the petition date. Although the legislative history contains no explanation for why this change was made, Congress presumably intended to accelerate the reorganization process or facilitate the prospects for competing plans in large, complex cases.

Leveraged loans continue to be a topic of interest in the current environment, particularly when they are pooled and securitized as collateralized loan obligations. A recent decision sheds light on whether and when leveraged loans and similar instruments may be classified as securities and, therefore, be subject to securities laws.

Last week’s Chapter 11 filing by NewPage Corporation, a company with assets and liabilities in the billions of dollars, stands as a relative rarity in the current restructuring environment.

The well known travails of Fred Wilpon, the principal owner of the New York Mets, have all converged this past week. He, his partner Saul Katz and their families and affiliated enterprises (the “Wilpon/Katz Group”) lost several hundred million dollars when Bernard Madoff’s long running Ponzi scheme finally unraveled at the height of the financial crisis in 2008.

On 17 October 2012, Nine Entertainment announced that it had reached an agreement with representatives of its senior and junior lenders with respect to a restructuring of its financing arrangements. Prior to the announcement, recent business press had been dominated by reports of Nine Entertainment's potential insolvency.

Key Points:

What the protracted negotiations surrounding Nine Entertainment have demonstrated is the importance of an interested party being able to assert they have an economic interest in the company.

German Parliament passes “Act for the Further Facilitation of the Restructuring of Companies“ (Gesetz zur weiteren Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen, ESUG)

The Privy Council sitting as the final court of appeal for the Cayman Islands recently considered a case concerning prioritisation in a Liquidation between feeder hedge funds where the investment medium was redeemable shares.

Background

The appellant in this case was the Liquidator of Herald Fund SPC ("Herald"). Herald is a Cayman Islands registered hedge fund that invested heavily into Bernard L Madoff Investment Securities LLC, the historic Ponzi scheme run by Bernard Madoff that collapsed spectacularly in 2008.