A recent decision out of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington will be of interest to both lenders and borrowers of loans that are expected to be traded. In Meridian Sunrise Village, LLC v.
A decision recently handed down by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington should be of interest to lenders and distressed debt purchasers. In Meridian Sunrise Village, LLC v. NB Distressed Debt Investment Fund Ltd. (In re Meridian Sunrise Village, LLC), 2014 BL 62646 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 6, 2014), a lender group had provided $75 million in financing to a company for the purpose of constructing a shopping center.
As the economy continues to emerge from the global recession in the late 2000s, one of the prevailing trends we have seen is the continuation of challenges to distressed investors that have employed a “loan-to-own” strategy. Boiled to its basics, the loan to own strategy is a method of investing by a distressed investor — frequently a private equity or hedge fund — that acquires the secured debt of a borrower at a discount (often deep) with the hope of either being paid at par or using the par value of the secured debt to acquire the company.
Once again, those of us in the commercial finance world are reminded of the age-old adage caveat emptor. This time the warning is directed at hedge funds and other investors with a penchant for purchasing distressed debt from bank syndicates.
In a recent decision that has captured the attention of the U.S. secondary loan market, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington starkly concluded that hedge funds “that acquire distressed debt and engage in predatory lending” were not eligible buyers of a loan under a loan agreement because they were not “financial institutions” within the Court’s understanding of the phrase.
A recent appellate decision in the Western District of Washington prohibited hedge fund creditors from voting on a debtor’s chapter 11 plan on the basis that the funds did not qualify as “financial institutions” for purposes of the definition of “Eligible Assignee” under the applicable loan agreement.1 While this counter-intuitive result seems driven by the specific facts of that case, this decision serves as a useful reminder of the importance of carefully reviewing assignment restrictions when purchasing loans in the secondary market.
Overview
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, on March 19, 2014, held that a corrupt debtor’s pre-bankruptcy cash transfer to a commodity broker was a “settlement payment” made “in connection with a securities contract,” thus falling “within [Bankruptcy Code] §546(e)’s safe harbor” and insulating the transfer from the trustee’s preference claim. Grede v. FCStone, LLC (In re Sentinel Management Group, Inc.), 2014 WL 1041736, *7 (7th Cir. Mar. 19, 2014).
Setoff provisions are commonly found in a variety of trading related agreements between hedge funds and their dealer counterparties. Last November, Judge Christopher Sontchi of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that “triangular setoff” is not enforceable in the context of a bankruptcy case.[1] “Triangular setoff” is a contractual right of setoff that permits one party (“Party One”) to net and set off contractual claims of Party One and its affiliated entities against another party (“Party Two”).
The "WARN Act" (Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act) requires that larger employers provide 60 days' notice in advance of plant closings or other mass layoffs. This has long been in conflict with bankruptcy practice. A recent Fifth Circuit decision, In re Flexible Flyer Liquidating Trust, 2013 WL 586823, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 11, 2013), confirms that exceptions to the WARN Act apply in bankruptcy and interprets these exceptions more broadly than previous decisions.