In a decision that may have implications for holders of community development district bonds and other similar “dirt bonds,” a Florida bankruptcy court has ruled that holders of community development district bonds do not always have plan voting rights when the underlying developer — as opposed to the development district itself — is the bankruptcy debtor.

On April 5, 2010, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida denied motions filed by Black Crow's secured creditor that would have likely ended the company's chance to reorganize its operations under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.

3V Capital Master Fund LTD. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of TOUSA, Inc. (In re TOUSA, Inc.), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14019 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2011).

Addressing a novel issue in In re: International Oil Trading Company, LLC, 548 B.R. 825 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2016), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently denied in part an involuntary debtor’s motion to compel production of communications between the judgment creditor who had filed the involuntary bankruptcy petition and the petitioner’s litigation funder. The Court found that the attorney-client privilege and work product protection were applicable to certain disclosures made to the litigation funder, a non-lawyer third-party.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently held that a bankruptcy debtor’s Chapter 11 proceeding should not be dismissed as filed in bad faith to delay or avoid foreclosure, but could not confirm the debtor’s proposed plan to lease its commercial property asset to a business that generates income from medical marijuana.

The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division recently ruled that debtors’ FCCPA and TCPA claims did not arise out of and were not related to their mortgage to fall under the jury waiver provisions in the mortgage where the claims arose out of attempts to enforce a debt that was discharged in bankruptcy.

The Court also ruled the debtors sufficiently stated a claim under FCCPA by alleging the creditor received notice of the debtors’ bankruptcy case to constitute actual knowledge the debtors’ were represented by counsel.

As an example of the conflicting and contrasting court rulings on the effect of surrender in bankruptcy (see our prior update), the District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fifth District, recently dismissed a borrower’s appeal from a final judgment of foreclosure because the borrower admitted during the course of his bankruptcy proceeding that he owed the mortgage debt and stated his intention to surrender the mortgage

The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District ("Second DCA"), recently held that a notice of assignment of a mortgage loan pursuant to the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act ("FCCPA"), § 559.715, Florida Statutes, is not a condition precedent to filing a mortgage foreclosure action, but certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court for resolution as one of great public importance. 

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently denied a mortgagee’s motion to reopen a Chapter 7 case to compel the surrender of real property, due to a five-year delay in filing the motion.

In so ruling, the court agreed with an earlier ruling from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida (In re Plummer, 513 B.R. 135 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014)), distinguishing “surrender” from “foreclosure,” and holding that a creditor cannot use the Bankruptcy Code to circumvent the obligations imposed by state law.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently denied a mortgagee's motion to reopen a Chapter 7 case to compel the surrender of real property, citing a five-year delay in filing the motion.

In so ruling, the Court agreed with an earlier ruling from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida (In re Plummer, 513 B.R. 135 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014)), distinguishing "surrender" from "foreclosure," and holding that a creditor cannot use the Bankruptcy Code to circumvent the obligations imposed by state law.