The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, applying Connecticut law, has held that coverage under a bankers professional liability policy was precluded by the policy's insolvency exclusion where the underlying claims "arose out of" the bankruptcy of a third-party securities broker or dealer. Associated Community Bancorp, Inc. v. The Travelers Cos., 2010 WL 1416842 (D. Conn. Apr. 8, 2010). The court also held that coverage was barred by the professional services exclusion of the management liability coverage part of the policy.

Yes, but only if the government declines to intervene in the action. United States ex rel. Kolbeck v. Point Blank Solutions, Inc., 1:08-cv-1187 (E.D. Va.), recently addressed this issue.

On February 7, 2011 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its eagerly awaited opinion in the consolidated appealIn re: DBSD North America, Inc., Docket Nos. 10-1175, 10-1201, 10-1352, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 27007.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the “Second Circuit”) on February 7, 2011 issued an opinion rejecting the often used gifting doctrine in the context of a plan of reorganization on the one hand, while affirming vote designation for claims not purchased in good faith on the other.In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 350480 (2d Cir. Feb. 7, 2011).

Industry observers have been waiting to see when bank failures arising out of the recent financial crisis would produce a wave of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) litigation similar to that seen in the early 1990s after the savings and loan crisis. With its second suit in recent months, the FDIC has shown that it will aggressively pursue claims against directors and officers in connection with failed depository institutions.

In pari delicto is a common law defense against liability in circumstances where the culpability of the plaintiff is at least as great as the culpability of the defendant. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania clarified Pennsylvania law on this on February 16, 2010, in Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health, Educ. & Research Found. v.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on June 2, 2010, sitting en banc, overruled its own precedential holding in Avellino & Beines v. M. Frenville Co. (Frenville), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), to hold that in the context of asbestos-related tort claims, a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code arises when an individual is exposed pre-petition to a product giving rise to an injury rather than when the injury manifests itself. JED-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s), No. 1563, slip op. at 18 (3d Cir. June 2, 2010).

In Beeman v. BGI Creditors’ Liquidating Trust (In re BGI, Inc.), 772 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2014), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered whether the doctrine of “equitable mootness” applied to the appeal of a confirmation order approving a liquidating chapter 11 plan. In a matter of first impression, the court ruled that the standards governing equitable mootness in an appeal of an order confirming a chapter 1 1 plan of reorganization also apply in the context of a chapter 11 liquidation.

On June 2, 2010, the Third Circuit overruled longstanding precedent interpreting the definition of a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code. In JELD-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s Inc.), No. 09-1563, slip op., (3d Cir. June 2, 2010) an en banc panel rejected the state law accrual theory of claims recognition established in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (Matter of M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), in favor of the more widely followed conduct test theory.

In Motorola, Inc. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007), the Second Circuit held that the most important factor for a bankruptcy court to consider in approving a pre-plan settlement pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 is whether the settlement’s distribution scheme complies with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme. Prior to this ruling, courts in the Second Circuit generally considered the following factors when approving settlement agreements: