The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld a bankruptcy court’s ruling that, where subordination agreements lacked explicit provisions addressing the payment of post-petition interest on senior unsecured debt, the agreements were ambiguous, and an inquiry into the parties’ intent was required. After probing the facts and analyzing New York law, the bankruptcy court determined that the contracting parties did not intend to subordinate the junior unsecured debt to post-petition interest on the senior debt.
Background
Since it was issued three years ago by the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, the Clear Channel decision (Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R. 25 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2008)) has been widely criticized as “an aberration in well-settled bankruptcy jurisprudence.” Before Clear Channel, conventional wisdom (and what most people perceived to be the law) supported the notion that a bankruptcy sale order that contained a good faith finding under Section 363(m) could not be disturbed on appeal.
The Seventh Circuit recently held that a chapter 11 bankruptcy plan of liquidation is not confirmable over a secured lender's objection if such plan prohibits the lender from credit bidding at a sale of its collateral. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit split with the Third and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal which have confirmed plans that block secured creditors' rights to credit bid, potentially making the issue ripe for review by the United States Supreme Court.
The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division, applying Indiana and federal law, has held that neither a bankruptcy nor an insured versus insured exclusion applied to bar coverage for claims brought by a bankruptcy trustee. According to the court, the bankruptcy exclusion is unenforceable because coverage arises from a policy that is a property interest of the debtors, and that property interest is protected under Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. The insured versus insured exclusion did not apply, the court held, because the policyholder and a court-appointe
Summary
A popular line of thinking among bankruptcy practitioners and commentators holds that substantive consolidation – the combining of assets and liabilities of a debtor and another debtor or non-debtor entity to satisfy creditor claims against both entities ratably from the resulting pool – is an equitable remedy of judicial invention with no specific foundation in the Bankruptcy Code.
Introduction
The Sixth Circuit continues to liberally define the "actual knowledge" required to trigger the 3-year ERISA statute of limitations and, in doing so, affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants in Brown v Owens Corning Investment Review (Case No. 09-3692).
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dealt a blow to secured creditors in its recent decision holding that a debtor may prohibit a lender from credit bidding on its collateral in connection with a sale of assets under a plan of reorganization. In the case of In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, No. 09-4266 (3d Cir. Mar. 22, 2010), the court, in a 2-1 decision, determined that a plan that provides secured lenders with the “indubitable equivalent” of their secured interest in an asset is not required to permit credit bidding when that asset is sold.
In Ogle v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 586 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2009), the Second Circuit has now become the second circuit court of appeals to recently conclude that general unsecured creditors may include postpetition attorneys’ fees as part of their claim when attorneys’ fees are permitted by contract or applicable state law.11