Postconfirmation liquidation and litigation trusts have become an important mechanism in a chapter 11 bankruptcy estate’s arsenal, allowing for the resolution of claims and interests without needlessly delaying confirmation in the interim. The specter of postconfirmation litigation may seem unremarkable. Section 1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code states that a plan may provide for retention or enforcement by the reorganized debtor, the trustee, or a representative of the estate of any claim or interest belonging to the estate.

The ability of a bankruptcy court to reorder the priority of claims or interests by means of equitable subordination or recharacterization of debt as equity is generally recognized. Even so, the Bankruptcy Code itself expressly authorizes only the former of these two remedies. Although common law uniformly acknowledges the power of a court to recast a claim asserted by a creditor as an equity interest in an appropriate case, the Bankruptcy Code is silent upon the availability of the remedy in a bankruptcy case.

One of the primary fights underlying assumption of an unexpired lease or executory contract has long been over whether any debtor breaches under the agreement are “curable.” Before the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, courts were split over whether historic nonmonetary breaches (such as a failure to maintain cash reserves or prescribed hours of operation) undermined a debtor’s ability to assume the lease or contract.

In a victory for secured creditors, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently held inRiver Road Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank (In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC), 2011 WL 2547615 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011), that a dissenting class of secured lenders cannot be deprived of the right to credit-bid its claims under a chapter 11 plan that proposes an auction sale of the lenders’ collateral free and clear of liens.

Much attention in the commercial bankruptcy world has been devoted recently to judicial pronouncements concerning whether the practice of senior creditor class “gifting” to junior classes under a chapter 1 1 plan violates the Bankruptcy Code’s “absolute priority rule.” Comparatively little scrutiny, by contrast, has been directed toward significant developments in ongoing controversies in the courts regarding the absolute priority rule outside the realm of senior class gifting— namely, in connection with the “new value” exception to the rule and whether the rule was written out of the Bankr

In a ruling that has been described as “very important” and the “first decision of its kind,” bankruptcy judge Shelley C. Chapman of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held on April 1, 2011, in In re Innkeepers USA Trust, 2011 WL 1206173 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s October 2010 Term (which extends from October 2010 to October 2011, although the Court hears argument only until June or July) officially got underway on October 4, three days after Elena Kagan was formally sworn in as the Court’s 112th Justice and one of three female Justices sitting on the Court.

In a much anticipated opinion,In re TOUSA, Inc., --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 1673910 (11th Cir. May 15, 2012), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has resolved a disagreement between the Bankruptcy Court and District Court for the Southern District of Florida by upholding the Bankruptcy Court’s findings—to the chagrin of lenders, who are now arguably exposed to new liabilities and higher standards of due diligence.

Since it was issued three years ago by the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, the Clear Channel decision (Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R. 25 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2008)) has been widely criticized as “an aberration in well-settled bankruptcy jurisprudence.” Before Clear Channel, conventional wisdom (and what most people perceived to be the law) supported the notion that a bankruptcy sale order that contained a good faith finding under Section 363(m) could not be disturbed on appeal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has ruled that the Johns-Manville bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction to enjoin direct action claims asserted against Travelers entities that are predicted on an independent duty owed by Travelers, that do not claim against the res of the Manville estate, and that seek damages unrelated to and in excess of Manville's insurance proceeds. Johns-Manville Corp. v. Chubb Indemnity Ins. Co., --- F.3d ---, 2008 WL 399010 (2d Cir. Feb. 15, 2008).