Although safeguard proceedings have been used successfully as a negotiation tool in a number of high-profile cases (such as the Eurotunnel case), they have represented just 1 per cent of all insolvency proceedings in France since the Business Safeguard Act 2005 introduced the safeguard procedure in January 2006. The main reason for this lack of success is the continuing stigma that is attached to insolvency proceedings in France.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently dismissed equitable subordination and fraudulent transfer claims filed by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Champion Enterprises, Inc. ("Champion") against more than 100 prepetition lenders to Champion (collectively, the "Defendants")1.

A “roll-up” is a form of postpetition financing which has the effect of elevating the priority of prepetition debt. In a roll-up, the prepetition debt of the postpetition, new money lenders is rolled into the debtor in possession financing, thus affording the prepetition debt superpriority status and, in many circumstances, ensuring the rolled-up debt is paid in full on the effective date of the plan of reorganization, (unless the lender consents to different treatment under the plan).1

Introduction

On January 25, 2010, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that provisions in a CDO indenture subordinating payments due to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc., as swap provider, constituted unenforceable ipso facto clauses under the facts and circumstances of this case. The Court also held that, because the payment priority provisions were not contained in the four corners of a swap agreement, the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor protections, which generally permit the operation of ipso facto clauses, did not apply.

In a recent ruling from the bench, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that Metavante Corporation’s suspension of payments under an outstanding swap agreement with Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.

Introduction

The High Court1 in England has confirmed the validity under English law of contractual provisions common in structured finance transactions which subordinate payments to a swap counterparty in circumstances where the swap counterparty has defaulted on its obligations under the terms of the relevant swap agreement.

The Judgment

Parties

On August 11, 2009, in one of the most significant rulings to date in the GGP bankruptcy proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court denied motions to dismiss as bad faith filings the bankruptcy cases of 20 GGP property-level subsidiaries. In denying the motions, the court stated that the fundamental creditor protections negotiated in the special purpose entity structures at the property level are in place and will remain in place during the pendency of the chapter 11 cases.

In a recently filed motion in the United States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York (the “Motion”), Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”) is seeking to compel Metavante Corporation (“Metavante”) to perform its obligations under a swap agreement between Metavante and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.

Following several weeks of speculation about how pending cash collateral, cash management, and debtor-in-possession financing motions might affect basic principles of structured finance, the bankruptcy court deferred a final ruling on the motions and extended the interim cash collateral order. In so doing, Judge Allan L. Gropper of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York suggested that CMBS lenders organize themselves so that common issues can be identified and resolution expedited.