Late last year, government responses to the subprime mortgage crisis proliferated but most attention focused on those measures that could be, and in some cases were, rapidly implemented — measures like the Treasury Department’s urging holders of certain subprime adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) to freeze interest rates temporarily or the Federal Reserve’s proposed tightening of lending requirements.

Introduction

Congress enacted amendments to the United States Bankruptcy Code in 2005 designed to increase certainty in the marketplace for mortgage loan repurchase agreements and other financial contracts.1 The contours – and limits – of these amendments were recently explored by the Delaware bankruptcy court in Calyon New York Branch v. American Home Mortgage Corp.

On February 16, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that a discounted cash flow analysis constituted “a commercially reasonable determinant[] of value” for purposes of section 562(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code.1 In so doing, the court upheld the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware decision sustaining the objection of American Home Mortgage Holdings, Inc.

In In re Calpine Corporation, 2007 WL 685595 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York considered the issue of whether secured creditors whose debt was being paid prior to its original maturity date were entitled to a prepayment premium.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently dismissed equitable subordination and fraudulent transfer claims filed by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Champion Enterprises, Inc. ("Champion") against more than 100 prepetition lenders to Champion (collectively, the "Defendants")1.

A “roll-up” is a form of postpetition financing which has the effect of elevating the priority of prepetition debt. In a roll-up, the prepetition debt of the postpetition, new money lenders is rolled into the debtor in possession financing, thus affording the prepetition debt superpriority status and, in many circumstances, ensuring the rolled-up debt is paid in full on the effective date of the plan of reorganization, (unless the lender consents to different treatment under the plan).1

Introduction

On January 25, 2010, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that provisions in a CDO indenture subordinating payments due to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc., as swap provider, constituted unenforceable ipso facto clauses under the facts and circumstances of this case. The Court also held that, because the payment priority provisions were not contained in the four corners of a swap agreement, the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor protections, which generally permit the operation of ipso facto clauses, did not apply.

In a recent ruling from the bench, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that Metavante Corporation’s suspension of payments under an outstanding swap agreement with Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.