A “roll-up” is a form of postpetition financing which has the effect of elevating the priority of prepetition debt. In a roll-up, the prepetition debt of the postpetition, new money lenders is rolled into the debtor in possession financing, thus affording the prepetition debt superpriority status and, in many circumstances, ensuring the rolled-up debt is paid in full on the effective date of the plan of reorganization, (unless the lender consents to different treatment under the plan).1

Introduction

On January 25, 2010, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that provisions in a CDO indenture subordinating payments due to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc., as swap provider, constituted unenforceable ipso facto clauses under the facts and circumstances of this case. The Court also held that, because the payment priority provisions were not contained in the four corners of a swap agreement, the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor protections, which generally permit the operation of ipso facto clauses, did not apply.

In a recent ruling from the bench, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that Metavante Corporation’s suspension of payments under an outstanding swap agreement with Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.

Introduction

The High Court1 in England has confirmed the validity under English law of contractual provisions common in structured finance transactions which subordinate payments to a swap counterparty in circumstances where the swap counterparty has defaulted on its obligations under the terms of the relevant swap agreement.

The Judgment

Parties

On August 11, 2009, in one of the most significant rulings to date in the GGP bankruptcy proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court denied motions to dismiss as bad faith filings the bankruptcy cases of 20 GGP property-level subsidiaries. In denying the motions, the court stated that the fundamental creditor protections negotiated in the special purpose entity structures at the property level are in place and will remain in place during the pendency of the chapter 11 cases.

In a recently filed motion in the United States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York (the “Motion”), Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”) is seeking to compel Metavante Corporation (“Metavante”) to perform its obligations under a swap agreement between Metavante and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.

Following several weeks of speculation about how pending cash collateral, cash management, and debtor-in-possession financing motions might affect basic principles of structured finance, the bankruptcy court deferred a final ruling on the motions and extended the interim cash collateral order. In so doing, Judge Allan L. Gropper of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York suggested that CMBS lenders organize themselves so that common issues can be identified and resolution expedited.

In the March 2008 issue, we discussed a decision from the In re Urban Communicators PCS, Ltd. Partnership1 case. In that decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that under section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Court could limit the rate of postpetition interest to be paid to an over-secured creditor to an amount less than the contract interest rate.

Last week the Court of Appeal of England and Wales handed down its decision in four appeals which raise a number of questions of construction in relation to derivatives in the form of interest rate swaps and forward freight agreements documented under the International Swaps and Derivatives Association Inc. Master Agreement (the “ISDA Master Agreement”).¹ In particular, the decision focuses on the interpretation of section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement.

Key Points