The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s dismissal of a single asset real estate case on Jan. 19, 2012, reasoning that the debtor’s proposed substitute collateral “was not the indubitable equivalent of the [undersecured lender’s] mortgage.”In re River East Plaza, LLC, 2012 WL 169760, *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 19, 2012) (Posner, J.). In the court’s words, the debtor “wanted [the lender] out of there and decided to seek confirmation of a [reorganization] plan . . .
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey recently held that a Cayman Islands collateralized-debt obligation issuer (“CDO”) could be a debtor under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) and declined to dismiss an involuntary case commenced against the CDO by certain noteholders on the grounds that the notes held by such noteholders were “non-recourse” notes. Below is a discussion of the court’s decision and its potential implications. The decision is currently being appealed.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s ruling that a debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) lender had breached its financing agreement, barring its claim for commitment and funding fees from the DIP. Arlington LF, LLC v. Arlington Hospitality, Inc., No. 09-3560, 2011 WL 727981, *9 (7th Cir. March 3, 2011), aff’g No. 08 C 5098, 2011 WL 3055350 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2009). Although the DIP itself had also breached the agreement, that breach was not, in the court’s view, effective until after the lender had already “walked away.” Id. at *6.
On Feb. 18, 2011, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (the “Circuit Court”) held that (i) an assignment of unsecured contract claims from AT&T to ReGen Capital I, Inc. (“ReGen”) was broad enough to include right to receive “cure” payments in the event the debtor, UAL Corporation (“United”), assumed the underlying executory contracts, but (ii) ReGen could not successfully assert a “cure” claim because United had not assumed the executory contracts, even though United’s confirmed plan of reorganization included them on a list of assumed contracts. ReGen Capital I, Inc. v. UAL Corp.
On Jan. 25, 2010, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) held that a trust deed provision reversing a priority of payment waterfall upon the bankruptcy of a credit support provider under a swap agreement is unenforceable under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held on Nov. 5, 2009, that a creditor was entitled to its post-bankruptcy legal fees incurred on a pre-bankruptcy indemnity agreement. Ogle v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., __F.3d __, No. 09-0691-bk, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 24329 (2d Cir. Nov. 5, 2009). Affirming the lower courts, the Second Circuit explained that the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) “interposes no bar . . . to recovery.” Id. at *8-9 (citing Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S.
In a decision to be hailed by buyers of distressed debt and bankruptcy claims on the secondary loan market, on Oct. 15, 2009, the New York Court of Appeals (the “Court”), in a fact-specific ruling, held that an assignment of claim does not violate New York’s champerty statute (forbidding trading in litigation claims) if the purpose of the assignment is to collect damages by means of a lawsuit for losses on a debt instrument in which the assignee holds a pre-existing proprietary interest. Trust for the Certificate Holders of the Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York entered an order on Sept. 17, 2009, granting a motion filed by Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (“LBSF”) to compel Metavante Corporation (“Metavante”) to continue to make payments to LBSF under an ISDA Master Agreement.
On April 16, 2009 and April 22, 2009, General Growth Properties, Inc. (“GGP”) and certain of its subsidiaries (the “Debtors”), including many subsidiaries structured as special purpose entities (the “SPE Debtors”), filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”).
The Ninth Circuit held on July 3, 2008, that an oversecured creditor’s claim for payment was entitled to a “presumption in favor of the loan agreement’s default rate (an additional 2% interest), subject only to reduction based upon any equities involved.” General Elec. Capt’l Corp. v. Future Media Productions, Inc., 2008 WL2610459, *2 (9th Cir. 7/3/08). Reversing the lower courts, the Court of Appeals held that the bankruptcy court had improperly applied a questionable Ninth Circuit precedent when denying the lender a default rate of interest. Id., at *4.