Debt-for-debt exchanges are not new, but are worth revisiting given the current economic climate. Furthermore, the recently enacted "Stimulus Act"1 provides some temporary relief to debtors from potentially harsh tax consequences of restructuring. The following discussion is relevant to issuers (also referred to as debtors) or holders (also referred to as creditors) of debt who are "US persons" (as defined in the US Internal Revenue Code).2

In order to illustrate some of the key US federal income tax consequences of a debt-for-debt exchange, consider the following example:

Must a foreign debtor's insolvency representative obtain permission from a United States bankruptcy court before exercising the debtor's rights as shareholder to remove and replace directors and officers of a US corporation? The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) of the Ninth Circuit recently held not, provided that the representative does not require judicial assistance to exercise these rights.1

The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (the “BAPCPA”) created an additional category of administrative expenses

Fundamental restructuring of insolvent companies—in any sector— is a fight for survival.

Given the global nature of the industry, it is perhaps no surprise that shipping companies and their advisors have sought appropriate court protection to alleviate creditor pressure and a possible break-up of the business where a consensual restructuring is not possible.

Setoff is a doctrine based as much on practical considerations as on equitable ones.

Creditors often compromise disputed claims against debtors and their guarantors. In connection with the settlement of claims against a debtor and its guarantor, the creditor may give the debtor and the guarantor written releases from further liability in exchange for a settlement payment. But what if the creditor later surrenders a portion of the payment in settlement of a preference recovery action? Can the creditor revive the guarantee notwithstanding the release?

In the September, 2006 issue of Insolvency Notes, the effect of the overhaul of the bankruptcy laws in the Czech Republic was discussed. As was the case at that time, the new insolvency laws were to become effective July 1, 2007. It now appears that the effective date will be delayed. The lower house of Czech Parliament gave fast-track approval recently to a bill for delaying implementation of the new bankruptcy act by six months, to January 1, 2008. Senate and presidential approval is still needed.

German Insolvency Law – a Leap Forward

Creditors have often complained that German insolvency law does not give them sufficient influence in insolvency proceedings. On 1 March 2012 new amendments to the German bankruptcy code came into force which go some way towards ameliorating this concern and make a host of changes which should improve German insolvency law to facilitate an insolvency culture which facilitates reorganisation rather than liquidation of assets.  

The recent financial crisis has resulted in events that once seemed impossible. Recently, in the federal government’s attempts to bail out the auto industry, an event unprecedented in American history almost occurred: the forced subordination of existing secured debt to new loans issued by the federal government. If the government were to revive this concept in future bailouts and attempt to subordinate the liens of secured creditors, a suit challenging the constitutionality of such action would have a good chance of success.

The Potential For Forced Subordination

In Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Company, the Supreme Court held that federal bankruptcy law does not automatically disallow claims for post-petition attorneys' fees incurred by a prepetition unsecured creditor simply because such fees are incurred in litigating issues arising under the Bankruptcy Code. The Court, however, left open the issue whether such claims may be disallowed on the basis that the attorneys' fees were incurred post-petition.