Do officers of a public corporation have an affirmative obligation to monitor corporate affairs? Yes, according to Judge Walsh in his recently issued memorandum opinion in Miller v. McDonald (In re World Health Alternatives, Inc.).1 Although "Caremark" oversight liability had previously generally only been imposed on directors of public corporations, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware determined that officers are not immune from such liability as a matter of law.

Equitable mootness is a doctrine grounded in equity pursuant to which an appeals court will dismiss an appeal of a bankruptcy order — even if effective relief could conceivably have been granted — because the implementation of such relief (e.g., the reversal of a bankruptcy court order) would be inequitable to third parties. This doctrine may be applied to achieve the necessary finality of bankruptcy orders and decisions that is required to effectuate the successful, expedient reorganization of debtors in bankruptcy.2

The UK has long-since established itself as a jurisdiction of choice for complex cross-border restructurings involving corporate groups whose principal operations are overseas.

Not necessarily so, according to the recent rulings of Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Judge Allan Gropper in the US$27 billion General Growth Properties Chapter 11 bankruptcy—at least with respect to the issue of substantive consolidation.

With US Circuit Courts split on the issue of whether bankruptcy courts have the power to release third parties from creditors’ claims without the creditors’ consent, a move known as non-consensual third-party release, the Seventh Circuit recently weighed in the affirmative in In re Airadigm Communications, Inc.1 With the split widening between the circuits on this matter, it seems more likely than ever that the Supreme Court could weigh in on and decide this critical issue to lenders and others.2

In a recent decision, Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts1, the United States Supreme Court considered whether a debtor has an absolute right under Section 706(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to convert a case to Chapter 13, clarifying a growing split among circuits as to whether the debtor’s bad faith conduct prior to his proposed conversion results in the forfeiture of the debtor’s right to convert.

This issue considers the most important provisions of the resolution adopted at the Plenary Session of the Supreme Commercial Court of the Russian Federation (the “SCC”) No. 88, dated 6 December 2013, “On Accrual and Payment of Interest on Creditors’ Claims in Insolvency” (the “Resolution”)1. The Resolution resolves a number of important practical issues and creates new regulations governing, in particular:

On September 15, 2009, the United States Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York ordered Metavante Corporation (“Metavante”) to make payments to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (“LBSF”) under a prepetition interest rate swap agreement guaranteed by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI” and, together with LBSF, “Lehman”) after Metavante had suspended ordinary course settlement payments under the swap.1 Metavante claimed a contractual right to withhold payment under Section 2(a)(iii) of the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement as a result of Lehman’s bankruptcy.

Must creditors holding claims denominated in a foreign currency against a debtor in a US bankruptcy case bear the risk of a postpetition decline in the value of the dollar? In In re Global Power Equipment Group Inc.,1 the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware says yes, holding that, pursuant to section 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, a contested claim denominated in foreign currency must be converted into United States currency as of the petition date instead of a later judgment or breach date.

The Conversion Date Dispute

In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Whalen (In re Enron Corp.), the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York considered whether the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy payment of an employment bonus one day before it became due was “for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made” for purposes of determining whether section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code made the payment avoidable as a preferential transfer.