On 31 December 2013, Banco de Portugal issued instruction no. 32/2013 implementing new rules on the identification and flagging of distress debt financing restructures (“Instruction 32/2013”) and revoking its instruction no.18/2012 on the same matter.

Instruction 32/2013 is applicable to credit institutions and to financial institutions with lending activity as well as branches of credit institutions with head offices outside the EU (“Institutions”).

The collapse of Lehman Brothers was a major test of the procedures developed by market participants to address counterparty credit risk and has uncovered deficiencies in risk management policies and their application.

Introduction

As a result of the recent turmoil in the financial markets, a number of clients have asked us questions about counterparty risk. The following is a summary of some of the key issues in dealing with financial counterparties. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code (“Bankruptcy Code”) and the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa et seq. (“SIPA”) each seek to protect “customer property” in the event of the failure, insolvency or liquidation of a broker-dealer.1 Neither affords customers the certainty of a 100% recovery, however.

Yesterday the Joint Forum, a group established in 1996 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) to deal with issues common to the banking, securities, and insurance sectors, released “Review of the Differentiated Nature and Scope of Financial Regulation – Key Issues and Recommendations”, which addresses key issues and recommendations on the differenti

The Banking Bill recasts key aspects of bank supervision and insolvency. With such wide-ranging changes to digest, financial institutions and other companies could be forgiven for ignoring the seemingly obscure clauses relating to financial collateral. But these provisions could remove legal uncertainty for those taking collateral particularly in traded markets (like energy trading) where banks are not always the main players.

In an interesting decision with important implications for both Chapter 15 practice and financial institutions’ global credit risk analyses, a US Chapter 15 court (the “Court”) granted recognition of a number of Brazilian proceedings involving entities within the OAS Group.  See In re OAS S.A. et al., Case No. 15-10937 (SMB) (Bankr.

There has been an upturn in the frequency of trade finance workouts, restructurings and formal insolvencies. Susan Moore and Luci Mitchell-Fry look at some key issues that banks face when trade finance lending passes to "bad bank".

The bank's decisions at every stage of a trade finance transaction are critical: at origination; when following a workout/restructuring; and once a formal insolvency process becomes a reality.

Origination

There has been an upturn in the frequency of trade finance workouts, restructurings and formal insolvencies. Drew Sainsbury looks at some key issues that banks face when trade finance lending passes to “bad bank”.

The bank’s decisions at every stage of a trade finance transaction are critical: at origination; when following a workout/restructuring; and once a formal insolvency process becomes a reality.

Origination

FSA made five sets of new rules at its March board meeting: