Restructuring companies in respect of which there exists a significant credit default swaps (CDS) market adds an additional level of complexity which the debtor and all stakeholders should consider and assess early on in the process, as it could determine the success or failure of a restructuring plan.
In a 2-1 opinion, the Second Circuit overruled the district court in Marblegate Asset Management LLC v. Education Management Corp., finding no violation of the Trust Indenture Act (“TIA”) in connection with an out-of-court debt restructuring.
Background
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes a new non-judicial receivership al-ternative for resolving troubled financial companies that could threaten the stability of the U.S. financial system (“Covered Financial Companies”), as described further below. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), on October 12, 2010, issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (the “Proposal”) to begin to implement the provisions of Title II.
Argentina—The long-running dispute over the payment of Argentina’s sovereign debt has been particularly active in recent weeks and months.
Events Leading Up to Argentina's Default
On 4 February 2014, our client, Zlomrex International Finance S.A. (“ZIF”), completed the restructuring of its approximately €118 million senior secured high yield notes due 2014 (the “Existing High Yield Bonds”). ZIF, a company incorporated in France, is a financing vehicle for the Cognor group, one of the largest suppliers (by volume) of scrap metal, the second largest seller of semi‑finished steel products and the fifth largest seller (by volume) of finished steel products in Poland.
On 12 December 2013, our client, Magyar Telecom B.V. (the “Company”), a Dutch holding company of the Invitel group of companies (the “Group”) and one of the leading telecommunication services providers in Hungary, completed the restructuring of its €345 million 9.5% Senior Secured Notes due 2016 (the “Notes”).
A crisis far beyond anything experienced in recent memory
The way in which regulators, investors, banks and governments respond to the current sovereign debt challenges will echo for many years. Decisions made today will, for better or worse, continue to have consequences far beyond our current time horizon. Getting it right will not be easy.
The UK's bank regulatory and insolvency law structures were unprepared for the global financial crisis. As a result, the UK government's response to intense bank stress in the immediate aftermath of the crunch led to a number of somewhat unsatisfactory ad hoc solutions ranging from nationalisations to encouraging otherwise healthy institutions to take over weaker banks. Generally speaking, there was a criticism, fairly made perhaps, that profits were privatised and losses had been socialised.
A new form of bankruptcy procedure, Accelerated Financial Safeguard (sauvegarde financière accélérée, “AFS”) was adopted by the French Parliament on October 22, 2010.
In light of recent reports released to the market, a lender in the leveraged loan market would be forgiven for indulging in some cautious optimism. New-issuance in July aggregated to €9.5 billion - a 13-month high. The year-to-date leveraged buy-out volume of €10 billion (38 deals) compares favourably with the €2.2 billion of volume (13 deals) for the same period in 2009. Against this backdrop, however, lenders should consider the recently released statistics from the Insolvency Service, and other economic data, which suggest that the economic outlook remains uncertain.