In Purewal v Countrywide Residential Lettings Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 1122, the receivers of a property did not make an insurance claim in relation to damage to the property.  The mortgagor of the property (a bankrupt) repaired the property himself.  He brought an action against the receivers for breach of duty by failing to make an insurance claim, claiming damages for the cost of the repairs.

In a recent decision, Judge David Novak of the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia vacated the Chapter 11 plan confirmation order entered by the bankruptcy court in the Mahwah Bergen Retail Group (formerly known as Ascena Retail Group) case, holding that the plan’s non-consensual third-party releases were unenforceable.¹ The ruling arrived shortly after an

Section 546(e) of the US Bankruptcy Code, which Congress enacted to promote stability and finality in financial markets, provides a safe harbor against the avoidance of certain securities transactions. Since the safe harbor’s inclusion in the original Bankruptcy Code, Congress repeatedly has expanded its protections to a growing assortment of financial transactions involving an increasing array of parties, whose involvement in the transaction may give rise to a defense to certain avoidance actions, including constructive fraudulent transfer claims.

Intercreditor agreements--contracts that lay out the respective rights, obligations and priorities of different classes of creditors--play an increasingly important role in corporate finance in light of the continued prevalence of complex capital structures involving various levels of debt. When a company encounters financial difficulties, intercreditor agreements become all the more important, as competing classes of creditors seek to maximize their share of the company's limited assets.

The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has weighed in on the question of whether a secured creditor’s ability to credit bid—to offset the amount of the creditor’s debt against the purchase price of sale assets rather than bid in cash—is a right guaranteed by statute even in “cramdown” plans of reorganization conducted under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. On June 28, 2011, the court ruled in favor of secured creditors with its much anticipated decision in In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC (River Road).1

In a decision that reaffirms its previous rulings on the jurisdictional limits of bankruptcy courts, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Chakarian (In re W.R. Grace & Co.)1 that bankruptcy courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over third-party actions against non-debtors if such actions could affect a debtor’s bankruptcy estate only following the filing of another lawsuit.

The Wall Street Journal reports that Russia has taken another step closer to defaulting on its sovereign debts after an industry watchdog overseeing the credit-default swaps market ruled Wednesday that Russia failed to meet its obligations to foreign bondholders when it paid them in rubles earlier this month.

Case Name and Number: Chicago v. Fulton, No. 19-357

Introduction: In an 8-0 opinion issued today, the Supreme Court held that a creditor’s passive retention of property properly seized from a debtor pre-bankruptcy does not violate the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649

A Chapter 11 bankruptcy is implemented through a plan that assigns allowed claims to classes of different priority levels. Unsecured claimants without priority are not entitled to any payment on their claims until all priority claims have been satisfied.

BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc & others [2011] EWCA Civ 227

The Court of Appeal has allowed companies around the country to breathe a solvent sigh of relief, as it has held that the so-called “balance sheet” test of insolvency in s123(2) Insolvency Act 1996 is intended to apply where a company has reached a “point of no return” rather than being used as a “mechanistic, even artificial, reason for permitting a creditor to present a petition to wind up a company”.