Although in some jurisdictions arbitration is a long-established form of alternative dispute resolution, this mechanism has only recently been regulated in Brazil. The Brazilian Commercial Code, enacted in 1850, already included a few sparse provisions regarding commercial arbitration, but there were no references to specific rules. It was not until 1996 that Brazil passed its first specific arbitration statute, Law No. 9,307/96 (Arbitration Law).

Perhaps not unexpectedly, on February 25, 2021, a New York bankruptcy court dismissed the involuntary bankruptcy petition brought earlier in the month by three student loan borrowers against Navient Solutions (see our prior post on the borrowers’ petition here). Navient is the student loan servicing arm of Navient Corporation, one of the world’s largest student loan-originators.

On November 26, 2019, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in Ultra Petroleum Corp. v.

As many will know, a failure to “...do all that is reasonable for the purpose of bringing the statutory demand to the debtor’s attention...” may result in an annulment of a bankruptcy order. But how is this requirement of Rule 46 of the Bankruptcy Rules met?

The question of what happens to an international arbitration when a party files for bankruptcy in the United States is arising with increasing frequency. In the United States, the public policy interests that underlie both bankruptcy and arbitration legislation sometimes clash on critical points. The federal courts have developed competing approaches to addressing these issues. This fractured caselaw introduces uncertainty at the intersection of arbitration and bankruptcy.

US Bankruptcy Code

On February 8, 2021, three student loan borrowers filed an involuntary petition against Navient Solutions LLC in New York bankruptcy court seeking to force Navient into bankruptcy.[1] Navient Solutions is the loan servicing arm of Navient Corporation, a student loan originator which manages approximately $300 billion in student loan debt for more than 12 million borrowers.

Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, No. 17-1657

Today, the Supreme Court held in an 8-1 decision that when a debtor, acting under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, rejects a contract licensing its trademarks, the contract is not rescinded and the debtor thus cannot revoke the trademark license.

In the course of the next few weeks, Omega Navigation Enterprises, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively, “Omega”), an international shipping enterprise, will find out if motions by certain of their lenders to, among other things, dismiss Omega’s chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings have been granted by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas.¹ If not, then Omega may be permitted to continue its attempt to reorganize its business under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.

In the case of In re: Exide Technologies, decided on June 1, 2010, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed two lower court decisions and held that a 1991 agreement between Exide Technologies and EnerSys Delaware Inc., which included a license to EnerSys for use of the “EXIDE” trademark, is not an executory contract that can be rejected by Exide in bankruptcy proceedings.

In a recent opinion arising from the Chapter 11 proceedings of Arcapita Bank, Judge Alvin Hellerstein of the US District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed a bankruptcy court decision denying safe-harbor protection to Shari’a-compliant Murabaha investment agreements.¹ Specifically, the district court held that the Murabaha agreemen