The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has weighed in on the question of whether a secured creditor’s ability to credit bid—to offset the amount of the creditor’s debt against the purchase price of sale assets rather than bid in cash—is a right guaranteed by statute even in “cramdown” plans of reorganization conducted under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. On June 28, 2011, the court ruled in favor of secured creditors with its much anticipated decision in In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC (River Road).1
In a decision that reaffirms its previous rulings on the jurisdictional limits of bankruptcy courts, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Chakarian (In re W.R. Grace & Co.)1 that bankruptcy courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over third-party actions against non-debtors if such actions could affect a debtor’s bankruptcy estate only following the filing of another lawsuit.
The Wall Street Journal reports that Russia has taken another step closer to defaulting on its sovereign debts after an industry watchdog overseeing the credit-default swaps market ruled Wednesday that Russia failed to meet its obligations to foreign bondholders when it paid them in rubles earlier this month.
Case Name and Number: Chicago v. Fulton, No. 19-357
Introduction: In an 8-0 opinion issued today, the Supreme Court held that a creditor’s passive retention of property properly seized from a debtor pre-bankruptcy does not violate the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).
Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649
A Chapter 11 bankruptcy is implemented through a plan that assigns allowed claims to classes of different priority levels. Unsecured claimants without priority are not entitled to any payment on their claims until all priority claims have been satisfied.
BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc & others [2011] EWCA Civ 227
The Court of Appeal has allowed companies around the country to breathe a solvent sigh of relief, as it has held that the so-called “balance sheet” test of insolvency in s123(2) Insolvency Act 1996 is intended to apply where a company has reached a “point of no return” rather than being used as a “mechanistic, even artificial, reason for permitting a creditor to present a petition to wind up a company”.
A recent decision by the US District Court for the Southern District of New York regarding the terms of an engagement letter demonstrates the need to clearly articulate the intended purpose and scope of an engagement. As the case described below demonstrates, if there is any ambiguity with regard to whether or not a fee must be paid and/or when an engagement is terminated, the resolution of such ambiguity may depend upon the description of the engagement’s purpose.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “SDNY”) has been a longstanding epicenter of Chapter 11 filings. Historically seen as one of the more pro-debtor forums in the country, large companies often filed in the SDNY to take advantage of that stance. Some debtors appear to have attempted to direct their cases to specific judges within the district who were seen as particularly pro-debtor. One recent example was the bankruptcy filing by OxyContin producer, Purdue Pharma.
In a new opinion issued in the Chuck E. Cheese bankruptcy cases, In re CEC Entertainment, Inc., Case No. 20-33163 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.),1 Judge Marvin Isgur of the U.S.
Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, No. 15-145