On April 16, 2009 and April 22, 2009, General Growth Properties, Inc. (“GGP”) and certain of its subsidiaries (the “Debtors”), including many subsidiaries structured as special purpose entities (the “SPE Debtors”), filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”).
Opinion Serves to Remind Lenders That “Bankruptcy Remote” Does Not Mean “Bankruptcy Proof”
Judge Allan L. Gropper of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a much-anticipated order on August 11, 2009, in the challenge to the bankruptcy filings by certain special-purpose-entity (“SPE”) affiliates of General Growth Properties, Inc. (“GGP”).
As is now well known, General Motors, Inc. and Chrysler LLC financially restructured themselves with the help of the United States Treasury. These restructurings occurred very quickly – Chrysler and GM each filed for bankruptcy and sold substantially all of their automobile-producing assets to newly created companies2 within approximately forty days. Each company used the bankruptcy process to massively deleverage and free itself from personal injury liability claims.
By some accounts, there is over $300 billion of commercial real estate debt set to mature over each of the next four years. As a result of a lack of demand, a lack of liquidity and lackluster valuations, a significant portion of this debt will go into default. In many cases, bankruptcies will ensue for both the projects and their owners.
On August 11, 2009, Judge Gropper of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York denied motions to dismiss bankruptcy petitions of several special-purpose entity subsidiaries (SPEs) of General Growth Properties, Inc. (GGP) that were solvent, financially healthy companies structured to be remote from the bankruptcy risks of GGP and its other affiliates.
Credit agreements typically provide that any amendment permitting the release of “all or substantially all” of the collateral requires the unanimous consent of the lenders. Many market participants expect that this provision provides protection against the agent and other lenders from consenting to the sale of the collateral and releasing the corresponding liens without the consent of all lenders.
On August 11, 2009, in a closely monitored dispute in the bankruptcy proceeding of General Growth Properties, Inc. (“GGP”), the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York rejected motions filed by several mortgage lenders to dismiss the bankruptcy filings of certain special purpose entity subsidiaries (SPEs) of GGP. In re General Growth Properties, Inc., et al., No. 09-11977, slip op. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2009).
On August 11, the Honorable Allan L. Gropper issued an opinion of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York denying five motions to dismiss certain Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases of several property-specific special purpose subsidiaries (SPE Debtors), including a number of issuers of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), that are owned by mall operator General Growth Properties, Inc.
In Greene v. Mullarkey, Case No. 07-30561-HJB, Adversary Proceeding No. 08-03009, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2191 (Bankr. D. Mass. Aug. 13, 2009), Christine Greene, her brother Matthew Mullarkey, and his wife Nicole Mullarkey were entangled in what the Bankruptcy Court described as an intra-family feud. The feud related to ownership of a two-family residential property and "played out on or in the property's porch, attic, basement, garage, yard and in-ground pool," prompting the Court to pay its "respect and admiration for the work done by the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court."
During the bankruptcy cycle following the recession of 2001, numerous debtors – notably airlines such as US Airways and United Air Lines, Inc. – undertook “distress terminations” of their ERISA-qualified defined benefit pension plans, which are insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The PBGC found itself holding large general unsecured claims arising from significant underfunding of pension plans insured by the PBGC as a result of these terminations. Efforts by the PBGC to obtain either administrative priority or secured status for these claims invariably failed.1