Becoming the first Court of Appeals to address an issue that has divided the bankruptcy and district courts, the Ninth Circuit adopted a forceful view of Stern v. Marshall,1 to hold in In re Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc.2 that absent the parties’ consent, the limitations imposed by Article III of the Constitution deprive a bankruptcy judge of the constitutional authority to enter judgment on fraudulent transfer claims brought against parties who have not filed proofs of claim.
Amid the economic hardships brought upon us by the Great Recession, the plight of cities, towns, and other municipalities across the U.S. has received a significant amount of media exposure. The media has been particularly interested in the spate of recent chapter 9 bankruptcy filings by Vallejo, Stockton, San Bernardino, and Mammoth Lakes, California; Jefferson County, Alabama; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; and Central Falls, Rhode Island. A variety of factors have combined to create a virtual maelstrom of woes for U.S.
On November 27, 2012, in a ruling that undoubtedly will impact the choice of venue for many large corporate bankruptcies in the future, Judge Shelley C. Chapman of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York transferred venue of the chapter 11 cases of Patriot Coal Corporation and ninety-eight of its affiliates to the Eastern District of Missouri.
In re 1701 Commerce, LLC, 477 B.R. 652 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2012) –
The capital stack for Presidio Hotel Fort Worth, L.P. consisted of (1) a senior loan of $39.6 million from Dougherty Funding, LLC, (2) a junior loan from Vestin Originations, Inc. and (3) a 20-year tax agreement with the City of Fort Worth pursuant to which the City made annual grant payments.
The trustee in the bankruptcy of an LLC member asked the Bankruptcy Court for a declaration that the LLC was dissolved pursuant to its operating agreement. The operating agreement mandated dissolution upon the bankruptcy of a member, but the court denied the trustee’s motion, relying on provisions in the Bankruptcy Act that trump contractual limitations. In re Warner, 480 B.R. 641 (Bankr. N.D. W.Va. Sept. 27, 2012).
Is a bankrupt pledgor legally bound to fulfill its promise to pledge a gift; or will a nonprofit have a successful claim against a pledgor if there is a subsequent failure to make payment because of a bankruptcy filing? A district court in Arizona recently held that St. Joseph's, a nonprofit hospital, did not have an enforceable claim in Bashas' Inc.'s bankruptcy for Bashas' $50,000 charitable pledge because of Bashas' bankruptcy. In re Bashas' Inc., 2012 WL 5289501 (D. Ariz. Oct. 25, 2012).
Particularly in the current economy, it is not uncommon for purchasers, anywhere along the supply-to-distribution chain, to claim financial distress and file for bankruptcy relief. How can a person or entity hope to collect on debts owed by a “bankrupt” purchaser? There follows a basic primer on bankruptcy terms and procedures, as well as steps an unsecured creditor may follow to be in the best position to collect on what is owed without incurring substantial attorneys’ fees.
A Primer
The effects of the recent fi nancial crisis and the ensuing recession continue to take their toll on municipalities in the United States, which are struggling with reduced revenues at the same time their residents have an increased need for government services.
In an important opinion released on November 27, 2012, Judge Shelley C. Chapman of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York transferred the Patriot Coal Corporation (Patriot Coal) chapter 11 bankruptcy cases from the Southern District of New York to the Eastern District of Missouri. This decision comes as a surprise to many observers who had expected, based on prior failed attempts to change venue in Enron and other large cases filed in the Southern District of New York, that Judge Chapman would defer to the Debtor’s choice of venue.