One of the most powerful tools a chapter 11 debtor has is the ability to assume or reject executory contracts under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.  In bankruptcy parlance, when a debtor “rejects” an executory contract, it is considered as though the debtor breached the agreement as of the date it filed for bankruptcy and sheds the debtor’s obligation to perform under the rejected contract.  The non-debtor party receives a claim for damages arising from the debtor’s breach; however, in many cases, it will be worth only pennies on the dollar.  The converse of rejection is

Under Section 436 of the Internal Revenue Code, a single employer defined benefit plan sponsored by a company in bankruptcy cannot pay any “prohibited payments” (e.g., lump sums, Social Security level income annuity payments) if the plan is less than 100% funded. In June 2012, the IRS issued proposed regulations permitting such a defined benefit plan to be amended to eliminate prohibited payment forms without violating the anti-cutback requirements of Internal Revenue Code Section 411(d)(6) if certain conditions are satisfied.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago has issued a decision with significant implications for licensees of trademarks whose licensors become debtors in bankruptcy. In Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, the Court considered whether rejection of a trademark license in bankruptcy deprives the licensee of the right to use the licensed mark.¹ Disagreeing with the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v.

A decision issued earlier this year by a Florida bankruptcy court¹ provides comfort to those who accept payment from a debtor-in-possession in return for goods or services. The court held that to invoke the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court in a lawsuit to recover an alleged impermissible post-petition transfer by a debtor, the plaintiff must establish that the debtor's estate was diminished as a result of the transfer to the defendant.

In a surprising decision certain to reinvigorate the ongoing debate about the scope of Stern v. Marshall, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a broad view of Stern and held that the structural nature of the limitations imposed on bankruptcy courts by Article III of the Constitution could not be waived by a party’s failure to object at the trial court level. The decision, Waldman v. Stone, 2012 WL 5275241 (6th Cir. Oct.

Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit recently created a split of authority regarding the rejection intellectual property licenses in bankruptcy by upholding a decision protecting a trademark licensee’s ability to use a debtor licensor’s trademark after the licensing agreement had been rejected. Chicago American Manufacturing’s licensing contract with debtor Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing authorized CAM to sell fans under Lakewood’s mark.

In its recent decision in Valley Bank and Trust Company v. Spectrum Scan, LLC (In re Tracy Broadcasting Corp.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit overturned lower court decisions that were casting serious doubt on a lender’s ability to realize value from its security interest in the proceeds of FCC broadcast licenses.  This alert will briefly describe the law governing security interests in FCC broadcast licenses, as well as the issues created by the lower courts – and ultimately resolved by the appeals court - in the Tracy case.

Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code is a “safe harbor” provision which restricts a debtor’s ability to recover or “clawback” what would otherwise be “avoidable” payments made to creditors. In the recent case of Lightfoot v. MXEnergy Elec., Inc., 690 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2012), the Fifth U.S.

In Waldman v.

Introduction