On 22 August 2019, the Federal Court of Australia (Federal Court) delivered a judgment that provides guidance on the framework within which cross-border cooperation between courts located in different jurisdictions might occur.
Just a note to alert readers that the latest decision of interest in this post-Amerind world dropped today in the Federal Court in Queensland. The liquidators of an insolvent corporate trustee successfully obtained orders appointing them receivers of the assets of two trusts to enforce the rights of exoneration and liens of the former trustee. The application was contested by the new trustee of the property trust, who sought to sell the key asset itself (a hotel – freehold title to the land).
This week’s TGIF considers a refusal by the Federal Court to declare void or terminate a DOCA on the grounds of alleged prejudice & injustice or due to omissions in the administrator’s report to creditors.
Background
R Developments Pty Ltd (the Builder) operated a residential construction business and entered into a contract for the construction of a residential property in 2012.
The decisions of In the matter of Assta Labels Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 1094 (Assta), In the matter of Psyche Holdings Pty Limited [2018] NSWSC 1254 (Psyche and, In the matter of Highlake Resources Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 1292 (Highlake) have added clarity to the factors courts will consider in assessing whether to grant an extension of time for registration on the ‘Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) (PPSA).
On 22 August 2019, the Federal Court of Australia (FCA) held that it could make a request to the New Zealand High Court (NZHC) that there be a joint hearing of those courts in respect of applications relating to the pooling of various funds held by companies subject to Australian and New Zealand liquidations, respectively.
Such a ‘letter of request’ could be issued by the FCA to a foreign court in the context of an Australian insolvency process pursuant to section 581 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act).
A recent decision of Justice Rees of the Supreme Court of New South Wales confirms the importance of keeping proper financial books and records in the context of insolvency.
This week’s TGIF considers the decision in Dudley (Liquidator) v RHG Construction Fitout & Maintenance Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1355, which serves as a reminder of the steps to be taken before commencing a ‘mothership’ preference claim proceeding.
The decision of the High Court of Australia in Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132 (Ramsay) clarified the limits of a Bankruptcy Court's discretion to "go behind" a judgment, that is, to investigate whether the underlying debt relied upon for the making of a sequestration order is, in truth and reality, owing to the petitioning creditor. Recently, the Ramsay decision was applied by the Federal Court of Australia in Dunkerley v Comcare [2019] FCA 1002 (Dunkerley).
It is well known that a company served with a statutory demand has 21 days to comply. If the recipient fails to pay the amount of the demand (or obtain a court order extending the period for compliance) within the period of 21 days after the demand is served, the creditor may rely on the failure as a basis to apply for the company to be wound up in insolvency. But what if the company pays, or seeks to pay, the amount of the statutory demand after the 21 day period has expired?
Like many areas of insolvency law, statutory demands have strict procedural requirements as to the timing by which documents must be served. But how is the passage of time calculated? If something is required to be done "21 days after" a document is served, is this intended to be inclusive or exclusive of the day the document was served? The Supreme Court of NSW recently grappled with this issue in Verimark Pty Ltd v Passiontree Velvet Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 455 and has provided clarity for lawyers and insolvency practitioners alike.