The decision of the High Court of Australia in Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132 (Ramsay) clarified the limits of a Bankruptcy Court's discretion to "go behind" a judgment, that is, to investigate whether the underlying debt relied upon for the making of a sequestration order is, in truth and reality, owing to the petitioning creditor. Recently, the Ramsay decision was applied by the Federal Court of Australia in Dunkerley v Comcare [2019] FCA 1002 (Dunkerley).
It is well known that a company served with a statutory demand has 21 days to comply. If the recipient fails to pay the amount of the demand (or obtain a court order extending the period for compliance) within the period of 21 days after the demand is served, the creditor may rely on the failure as a basis to apply for the company to be wound up in insolvency. But what if the company pays, or seeks to pay, the amount of the statutory demand after the 21 day period has expired?
Like many areas of insolvency law, statutory demands have strict procedural requirements as to the timing by which documents must be served. But how is the passage of time calculated? If something is required to be done "21 days after" a document is served, is this intended to be inclusive or exclusive of the day the document was served? The Supreme Court of NSW recently grappled with this issue in Verimark Pty Ltd v Passiontree Velvet Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 455 and has provided clarity for lawyers and insolvency practitioners alike.
This week’s TGIF article considers the case of Kelly, in the matter of Halifax Investment Services Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (No 5) [2019] FCA 1341, in which liquidators of two linked investment companies in Australia and New Zealand sought to hold concurrent hearings in the Federal Court and in the High Court of New Zealand.
What happened?
What are Court ordered inquiries into liquidator conduct?
Courts have a range of powers in relation to liquidators, including the power to order an inquiry into the external administration of a company and thus, the conduct of liquidators under sections 90-5 to 90-20 of Schedule 2 to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), previously, section 536 of the Corporations Act 2001.
An important decision[1] has been handed down by the High Court of Australia which relates to the order of payment of statutorily preferred debts out of trust property held by an insolvent corporate trustee.
This week’s TGIF considers the circumstances in which a special purpose liquidator will be appointed to investigate claims the liquidator has already determined are ‘not viable’ in the decision in Williams & Kersten Pty Ltd v Walton Constructions (Qld) Pty Ltd (in liq), in the matter of Walton Constructions (Qld) Pty Ltd (in liq)
On 22 August 2019, the Federal Court of Australia (Federal Court) delivered a judgment that provides guidance on the framework within which cross-border cooperation between courts located in different jurisdictions might occur.
Just a note to alert readers that the latest decision of interest in this post-Amerind world dropped today in the Federal Court in Queensland. The liquidators of an insolvent corporate trustee successfully obtained orders appointing them receivers of the assets of two trusts to enforce the rights of exoneration and liens of the former trustee. The application was contested by the new trustee of the property trust, who sought to sell the key asset itself (a hotel – freehold title to the land).
This week’s TGIF considers a refusal by the Federal Court to declare void or terminate a DOCA on the grounds of alleged prejudice & injustice or due to omissions in the administrator’s report to creditors.
Background
R Developments Pty Ltd (the Builder) operated a residential construction business and entered into a contract for the construction of a residential property in 2012.