On 14 December 2010 the English Court sanctioned four connected schemes of arrangement for German companies in the Tele Columbus group.
In the case of banking institutions dealing with the unique world of insurance insolvency, the results may not be as dramatic as in other cultural clashes, but they can be equally confused. This is because insurance insolvency operates in its own separate world, where the usual rules of bankruptcy do not apply and where, without appropriate safeguards, having a secured claim may not guarantee repayment. For banks and other secured creditors, lending to insurance companies is governed by a separate set of rules to which careful attention must be paid.
Years ago, second lien lenders adhered to the truism about children -- they were seen but not heard. As our children have grown more vocal in recent years, so too have second lien lenders. A spate of recent bankruptcy cases demonstrate that second lien lenders have been both seen and heard at many critical junctures in the chapter 11 timeline -- at the sale of the debtor’s assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code,1 in seeking the appointment of an examiner,2 when voting on a chapter 11 plan,3 and in connection with the confirmation hearing.4
The rapid evolution of a robust secondary market for claims against the three largest failed Icelandic banks provides a powerful example of the prompt adaptation of an existing secondary-market legal framework -- originally developed in the US and Europe -- to a complex and novel bankruptcy regime and trading environment.
The United States Supreme Court declined to review a Second Circuit decision wherein a bankruptcy trust fund established to reimburse asbestos victims while barring them from future lawsuits against insurers was held to not apply to Chubb Indemnity Insurance Co. In the underlying matter, Chubb sought contribution for asbestos injury claims from The Travelers Indemnity Co. The trust was established in 1986 by a bankruptcy court and funded with hundreds of millions of dollars from insurers for the benefit of asbestos claimants and their families.
As previously discussed here, Ambac Financial Group Inc. has filed for bankruptcy for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief with United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. Immediately following its bankruptcy filing, Ambac sued the United States to block the Internal Revenue Service from placing a lien on its assets in an attempt to recover an estimated $700 million in tax refunds that the agency believes it may be owed.
As we first covered here, Ambac Financial Group Inc., the parent of the ailing Wisconsin-domiciled bond insurer Ambac Assurance Corp., filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief with United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York on November 8, 2010.
In another instalment of the Scottish Lion saga (see our previous blog entries here, here and here) the Outer House of the Court of Session (the Scottish First Instance Court) has ruled that where a scheme creditor submits documents in support of his claim fo
Ambac Financial Group Inc., parent of the troubled Wisconsin-domiciled bond insurer Ambac Assurance Corp., filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief on November 8, 2010. As was alluded to in our blog post last week, Ambac has been unable to raise additional capital or come to terms with its debt holders. Additionally, while Ambac had originally sought to enter bankruptcy as part of a prepackaged agreement, this too failed. Ambac’s bankruptcy filing comes amid a recent disclosure it made in a filing with the U.S.
In the jargon of the secondary bank loan market, loans beneficially owned by participation may be "elevated" to direct assignments once requisite administrative agent and/or borrower consent is obtained. Such "elevations" customarily have been viewed as straightforward transactions -- when completed, the participant simply stands in the shoes of the grantor and becomes the lender of record of the loan on the books of the administrative agent.