《国家税务总局关于纳税人资产重组有关增值税问题的公告》(02/18/2011)

The State Administration of Taxation released the Announcement onIssues Concerning Value-Added Tax Relevant to Taxpayers’ Assets Restructuring (the “VAT Announcement”) on February 18, 2011. The effective date of the Announcement is March 1, 2011.

The trading rules and conventions of the loan market are well known to its participants. Similarly, the laws and practices governing equity securities trading in the U.S. are quite familiar to securities market professionals. The opportunity for confusion may arise, however, when these two markets quickly converge—for example, when the loans of a reorganized borrower are converted into or satisfied by the issuance of equity securities.

Does this sound familiar? A newly formed entity purchases distressed bank debt after the debtor has proposed a reorganization plan. The purchaser obtains a blocking position and uses its negotiating leverage to obtain control of the plan process and ultimately the borrower’s assets, which have strategic importance to the purchaser.

On February 7, 2011, in In re DBSD North America, Inc.,1 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit released its opinion joining the Third Circuit in condemning socalled “gifting plans,” thus deepening the perceived circuit split with the First Circuit which has been interpreted as approving of gifting plans. In so doing, the Second Circuit relied on the U.S. Supreme Court cases of Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship2 and Norwest Bank Worthington v.

The current "Great Recession," which began in late 2007 with a maelstrom in the debt capital markets, has necessitated a rethinking of the federal income tax rules governing debt restructurings. The harsh rules2 promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in reaction to the 1991 taxpayer-favorable decision in Cottage Savings v. Commissioner,3 have been inhibiting restructurings. Instead, rules that did not trigger adverse tax results have been needed to induce lenders and borrowers to restructure obligations that can no longer be paid according to their terms.

Years ago, second lien lenders adhered to the truism about children -- they were seen but not heard. As our children have grown more vocal in recent years, so too have second lien lenders. A spate of recent bankruptcy cases demonstrate that second lien lenders have been both seen and heard at many critical junctures in the chapter 11 timeline -- at the sale of the debtor’s assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code,1 in seeking the appointment of an examiner,2 when voting on a chapter 11 plan,3 and in connection with the confirmation hearing.4

The rapid evolution of a robust secondary market for claims against the three largest failed Icelandic banks provides a powerful example of the prompt adaptation of an existing secondary-market legal framework -- originally developed in the US and Europe -- to a complex and novel bankruptcy regime and trading environment.

In the jargon of the secondary bank loan market, loans beneficially owned by participation may be "elevated" to direct assignments once requisite administrative agent and/or borrower consent is obtained. Such "elevations" customarily have been viewed as straightforward transactions -- when completed, the participant simply stands in the shoes of the grantor and becomes the lender of record of the loan on the books of the administrative agent.

In the wake of the recent financial crisis, the legal system continues to sort out rights and obligations of financial market participants. This is especially true for participants in the over-the-counter derivatives markets.

The tremendous growth of that largely unregulated market has been accompanied by the development of sophisticated contractual frameworks and specific bankruptcy legislation expressly intended to reduce uncertainty around the amount and type of claims that could ultimately be asserted by market participants following bankruptcy of a derivative counterparty.

T he recent surge in activity in the claims trading market in the wake of Lehman Brothers and other high-profile bankruptcies has created a backlog of open trades and heightened price volatility. This is a perilous combination. The lack of standardized trading documentation and uniform trading conventions, as well as the dramatic influx of new counterparties into the claims market, are factors that have contributed to longer settlement timeframes and increased uncertainty in the market.