On April 25, 2011, as widely expected, a group of Lehman creditors holding claims arising from terminated derivatives transactions filed a competing plan of reorganization and related disclosure statement in the Debtors' chapter 11 cases. As a result of the new filing, there are now three competing plans – (1) the Debtors’ Plan, (2) the Ad Hoc Group’s Plan (filed by a group of bondholder creditors) and (3) the Non-Consolidation Plan (filed by the derivative claimants) - in the Lehman bankruptcy proceedings.
Introduction
On February 16, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that a discounted cash flow analysis constituted “a commercially reasonable determinant[] of value” for purposes of section 562(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code.1 In so doing, the court upheld the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware decision sustaining the objection of American Home Mortgage Holdings, Inc.
The trading rules and conventions of the loan market are well known to its participants. Similarly, the laws and practices governing equity securities trading in the U.S. are quite familiar to securities market professionals. The opportunity for confusion may arise, however, when these two markets quickly converge—for example, when the loans of a reorganized borrower are converted into or satisfied by the issuance of equity securities.
Does this sound familiar? A newly formed entity purchases distressed bank debt after the debtor has proposed a reorganization plan. The purchaser obtains a blocking position and uses its negotiating leverage to obtain control of the plan process and ultimately the borrower’s assets, which have strategic importance to the purchaser.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently dismissed equitable subordination and fraudulent transfer claims filed by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Champion Enterprises, Inc. ("Champion") against more than 100 prepetition lenders to Champion (collectively, the "Defendants")1.
In the first part of this article, we considered the effect of section 365(d)(4) and other Bankruptcy Code sections on retailer debtors and their respective landlords, as well as on how retailer debtors can utilize the holiday sales season to implement a successful reorganization.
Years ago, second lien lenders adhered to the truism about children -- they were seen but not heard. As our children have grown more vocal in recent years, so too have second lien lenders. A spate of recent bankruptcy cases demonstrate that second lien lenders have been both seen and heard at many critical junctures in the chapter 11 timeline -- at the sale of the debtor’s assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code,1 in seeking the appointment of an examiner,2 when voting on a chapter 11 plan,3 and in connection with the confirmation hearing.4
The rapid evolution of a robust secondary market for claims against the three largest failed Icelandic banks provides a powerful example of the prompt adaptation of an existing secondary-market legal framework -- originally developed in the US and Europe -- to a complex and novel bankruptcy regime and trading environment.
When selling assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code or pursuant to a plan, debtors typically conduct auctions, selecting the highest or best bidder as the purchaser. Section 363 auctions are intended to enable debtors to maximize the value of their assets, while ensuring "finality and integrity in the process . . . ."1