On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued a fraudulent transfer ruling in TOUSA, Inc.'s chapter 11 case with wide-ranging implications for the financing community. As discussed herein, this decision weakens protections for secured lenders, especially when extending credit to distressed borrowers.

In what it described as “an easy decision,” the U.S. Supreme Court issued its eagerly anticipated decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC et al. v. Amalgamated Bank¹ on May 29, 2012.

Buying natural gas assets from financially distressed companies is an inherently risky proposition.  Even when an attractive prospect is identified, the purchaser has to overcome a number of issues such as clearing up title, including mechanic and materialman liens and getting assignments of contracts and lessor consents.  Assuming these hurdles can be managed, the purchaser is also faced with legacy liability problems ranging from plugging and abandonment and decommissioning costs, unknown claims from interest owners under joint operating agreements, general claims from oil field

Technological innovation has changed the landscape of domestic natural gas production from shortage to surplus. The result: a glut of natural gas and historically low prices. While many producers have successfully hedged against this risk to date, as older hedges roll off, many companies are unable to obtain replacement hedges at attractive prices. Some have even resorted to monetizing their in-the-money hedges to raise capital today (and borrowing against the future).

This discussion is being provided to our clients and friends to analyze the challenges presented in this difficult economic environment when an FDICinsured institution experiences a capital difficulty and is directed by the Banking Regulators¹ to restore the institution's capital adequacy.² In the past four years, the FDIC has closed approximately 400 insured institutions—as of January 1, 2012, the FDIC has indicated that there were over 800 banks on its "problem bank list." The difficulties experienced by many of these institutions are summarized in this analysis—

The Issue

The issue is whether a Chapter 11 plan can be crammed down over the secured lender’s objection where the plan provides for the sale or transfer of the secured lender’s collateral with the proceeds going to the secured lender without the secured lender having the right to credit bid for is collateral up to the full amount of its claim.  

Can a U.S. patent licensee whose license has been rejected by a licensor under foreign law in a foreign bankruptcy rely on the protections of § 365(n) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code? On October 28, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia issued an opinion addressing this in the Chapter 15 case of Qimonda AG (“Qimonda”).⁵ The bankruptcy court held that the application of § 365(n) to executory licenses to U.S. patents was required to sufficiently protect the interests of U.S.

On October 28, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia issued an opinion in the Chapter 15 case of Qimonda AG (“Qimonda”).¹ The bankruptcy court held that the application of § 365(n) to executory licenses to U.S. patents was required to sufficiently protect the interests of U.S. patent licensees under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code and that the failure of German insolvency law to protect patent licensees was “manifestly contrary” to United States public policy.

Rejection of a contract in bankruptcy may not always accomplish a debtor’s goal to shed ongoing contractual obligations and liabilities, especially when dealing with employee benefit plans. On October 13, 2011, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals highlighted this issue in its opinion in Evans v. Sterling Chemicals, Inc.¹ regarding the treatment of a pre-bankruptcy asset purchase agreement which contained a provision addressing the debtor-acquiror’s post-closing ERISA retiree benefit plan obligations to its new employees resulting from the transaction.

Numerous municipalities in California and elsewhere are struggling financially. Indeed, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania and Central Falls, Rhode Island have both recently filed for Chapter 9 protection. State governments may have neither the economic reserves nor the political will to bail out troubled cities and counties. These circumstances have raised the focus on Chapter 9 as a tool for reorganizing municipality debt obligations and has deepened the debate between states and their municipalities about the best strategies for addressing a fiscal crisis.