In the jargon of the secondary bank loan market, loans beneficially owned by participation may be "elevated" to direct assignments once requisite administrative agent and/or borrower consent is obtained. Such "elevations" customarily have been viewed as straightforward transactions -- when completed, the participant simply stands in the shoes of the grantor and becomes the lender of record of the loan on the books of the administrative agent.

In addition to the cases discussed in "Considerations in Terminating an Insolvent Franchisee" in the June 24, 2010, Franchise Alert (available at www.wileyrein.com/insolvent_franchisee), two recently reported decisions have looked at franchisor attempts to gain relief from bankruptcy stays in order to enforce post-termination provisions.

In the wake of the recent financial crisis, the legal system continues to sort out rights and obligations of financial market participants. This is especially true for participants in the over-the-counter derivatives markets.

The tremendous growth of that largely unregulated market has been accompanied by the development of sophisticated contractual frameworks and specific bankruptcy legislation expressly intended to reduce uncertainty around the amount and type of claims that could ultimately be asserted by market participants following bankruptcy of a derivative counterparty.

T he recent surge in activity in the claims trading market in the wake of Lehman Brothers and other high-profile bankruptcies has created a backlog of open trades and heightened price volatility. This is a perilous combination. The lack of standardized trading documentation and uniform trading conventions, as well as the dramatic influx of new counterparties into the claims market, are factors that have contributed to longer settlement timeframes and increased uncertainty in the market.

As widely reported, the bankruptcy auction for the Texas Rangers Major League Baseball franchise ended with a winning $593 million bid from an ownership group led by Nolan Ryan.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware has held that policy proceeds were not part of the insured entity’s bankruptcy estate because previous entity claims were dismissed with prejudice, it was highly speculative that the bankruptcy trustee would approve indemnification of directors and officers and the policy’s priority of payment provision provided that entity coverage was only available after payment of proceeds for direct coverage to insured persons. In re Downey Fin. Corp., 428 B.R. 595 (D. Del. Bankr. May 7, 2010).

During the current economic downturn, a number of financially distressed franchisees either have filed or may file for bankruptcy protection to restructure their financial obligations. As a result, franchisors should familiarize themselves with some bankruptcy basics before they are confronted with the situation.

What Happens If One of Our Franchisees Declares Bankruptcy?

In our Distressed Investor Alert dated December 23, 2009, we wrote that Bankruptcy Rule 2019, an often ignored procedural rule in U.S. bankruptcies, had returned to the public eye in light of the controversial revisions to Rule 2019 (“Revised Rule 2019”)1 proposed by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (the "Rules Committee").

In a decision not designated for publication, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, applying California law, has held that an insurer's declaratory judgment complaint for rescission effectuated the rescission of the policy and that the subsequent coverage litigation confirmed the validity of the rescission. In re Sonic Blue Inc., 2010 WL 2034798 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2010).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, applying New York law, has held that an inadequate consideration exclusion unambiguously bars coverage for a lawsuit arising out of a debt restructuring transaction. Delta Financial Corp. v. Westchester Surplus Ins. Co. (In re Delta Financial Corp.), 2010 WL 1784054 (3d Cir. May 5, 2010).