Setoff is a doctrine based as much on practical considerations as on equitable ones.

The recent financial crisis has resulted in events that once seemed impossible. Recently, in the federal government’s attempts to bail out the auto industry, an event unprecedented in American history almost occurred: the forced subordination of existing secured debt to new loans issued by the federal government. If the government were to revive this concept in future bailouts and attempt to subordinate the liens of secured creditors, a suit challenging the constitutionality of such action would have a good chance of success.

The Potential For Forced Subordination

On February 11, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, addressing an apparent issue of first impression, ruled that a series of gas supply contracts might constitute “commodity forward agreements” and, in turn, “swap agreements,” exempt from the court-appointed trustee’s avoidance actions.1 The Court reversed and remanded the decision from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, which had held that the commodity supply contracts at issue were insufficiently tied to financial markets to be considered protected “commodity forwar

Debt-for-debt exchanges are not new, but are worth revisiting given the current economic climate. Furthermore, the recently enacted "Stimulus Act"1 provides some temporary relief to debtors from potentially harsh tax consequences of restructuring. The following discussion is relevant to issuers (also referred to as debtors) or holders (also referred to as creditors) of debt who are "US persons" (as defined in the US Internal Revenue Code).2

In order to illustrate some of the key US federal income tax consequences of a debt-for-debt exchange, consider the following example:

The recent ruling by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana in the Chapter 11 case of In re Yellowstone Mountain Club LLC 1 (“Yellowstone”), which found that a senior secured lender had engaged in “overreaching and predatory lending practices”, suggests an application of lender liability theory from today’s perspective to a transaction that took place before the credit crisis.  

On May 14, 2009, Judge Allan Gropper of the US Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York, approved a US$400 million DIP financing package in the US$27 billion General Growth Properties, Inc. (“GGP”) Chapter 11 case. Judge Gropper’s ruling also included approval of GGP’s proposal to use cash flow generated by shopping centers, structured by GGP as bankruptcy remote, special purpose entities, to fund GGP’s ongoing central operations while in bankruptcy.  

On September 15, 2009, the United States Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York ordered Metavante Corporation (“Metavante”) to make payments to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (“LBSF”) under a prepetition interest rate swap agreement guaranteed by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI” and, together with LBSF, “Lehman”) after Metavante had suspended ordinary course settlement payments under the swap.1 Metavante claimed a contractual right to withhold payment under Section 2(a)(iii) of the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement as a result of Lehman’s bankruptcy.

Not necessarily so, according to the recent rulings of Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Judge Allan Gropper in the US$27 billion General Growth Properties Chapter 11 bankruptcy—at least with respect to the issue of substantive consolidation.