Introduction

Over the last few years, the European leveraged finance market has seen rapid growth of senior secured high yield notes (“SSN”) and senior secured covenant-lite term loan  B (“TLB”) financings. A common feature of both SSNs and TLBs (together “Senior Secured Debt”) is that their terms typically permit the incurrence of senior unsecured debt by a borrower and its restricted subsidiaries (a “Credit Group”) subject to either satisfaction of a  financial ratio or through various permitted debt baskets.

Recently, in In re Northwest Airlines Corp.,1 Bankruptcy Judge Allan Gropper issued an opinion requiring a group of hedge funds that had formed an ad hoc committee of equity security holders (the “Ad Hoc Equity Committee”) to disclose “the amounts of claims or interests owned by the members of the committee, the times when acquired, the amounts paid therefor, and any sales or other disposition thereof” in order to comply with Rule 2019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Bankruptcy Rules”).

Background

In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Whalen (In re Enron Corp.), the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York considered whether the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy payment of an employment bonus one day before it became due was “for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made” for purposes of determining whether section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code made the payment avoidable as a preferential transfer.

The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (the “BAPCPA”) created an additional category of administrative expenses

In a recent decision, Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts1, the United States Supreme Court considered whether a debtor has an absolute right under Section 706(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to convert a case to Chapter 13, clarifying a growing split among circuits as to whether the debtor’s bad faith conduct prior to his proposed conversion results in the forfeiture of the debtor’s right to convert.

On March 20, 2007, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., case docket no. 127 S.Ct. 1199 (2007), that federal bankruptcy law does not preclude an unsecured creditor from obtaining attorney’s fees authorized by a valid prepetition contract and incurred in postpetition litigation. In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s ruling in Fobian v. Western Farm Credit Bank (In re Fobian), 951 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir.

In Motorola, Inc. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007), the Second Circuit held that the most important factor for a bankruptcy court to consider in approving a pre-plan settlement pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 is whether the settlement’s distribution scheme complies with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme. Prior to this ruling, courts in the Second Circuit generally considered the following factors when approving settlement agreements:

On May 18, 2007, in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla (“Gheewalla”),1 the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision2 in which the Court of Chancery precluded creditors from filing direct suits for breach of fiduciary duty against directors of corporations that are either in the zone of insolvency or are actually insolvent. With its decision, the Delaware Supreme Court has limited creditors’ ability to sue directors for breach of fiduciary duty.

In re Foamex Int’l, Inc., et al.,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that the damage cap contained in section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code applies not only to rental payments, but also to damages from the breach of any lease covenants, including maintenance and repair obligations. In doing so, the Court reduced a specific landlord’s claim and recovery by more than $700,000 and established precedent that could diminish the claims of landlords in other cases pending and filed in Delaware.

Background

Equitable mootness is a doctrine grounded in equity pursuant to which an appeals court will dismiss an appeal of a bankruptcy order — even if effective relief could conceivably have been granted — because the implementation of such relief (e.g., the reversal of a bankruptcy court order) would be inequitable to third parties. This doctrine may be applied to achieve the necessary finality of bankruptcy orders and decisions that is required to effectuate the successful, expedient reorganization of debtors in bankruptcy.2