The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently affirmed the dismissal of LIBOR-manipulation fraud claims brought by a group of hotel-related entities and their investor against a bank and two of its subsidiaries.

In so ruling, the Second Circuit held that:

(a) the borrower and related entities lacked standing to sue because they failed to list their potential claims in their bankruptcy case and the claims were barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel; and

(b) the claims of the investor and guarantors were untimely and barred by the law of the case.

The US Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s years-long litigation against the former CEO of MF Global Holdings Ltd. has concluded with a settlement. After the brokerage firm MF Global went bankrupt in a 2011 liquidity crisis, the CFTC sued CEO Jon Corzine for dipping into nearly $1 billion of segregated client funds in an effort to obtain badly needed liquidity. The settlement requires Corzine to pay a $5 million fine out of his own pocket, rather than from insurance.

On July 16, 2014, the Uniform Law Commission (the “Commission”) approved a series of changes to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (the “UFTA”). The UFTA had previously been adopted by most states in the country, including Michigan. The Commission’s amendments included changing the name of the law from the UFTA to the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (the “UVTA”).

Earlier this month, the United States Supreme Court agreed to review a Seventh Circuit decision regarding the scope of the so-called “safe harbor” from avoidable transfers provided in Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. Many in the U.S. bankruptcy industry expect that the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., Case No. 16-784, in order to resolve a long-running split among the 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 8th, and 10th Circuits, on the one hand, and the 7th and 11th Circuits on the other.

On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. The Court's decision could resolve a circuit split as to whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code can shield from fraudulent conveyance attack transfers made through financial institutions where such financial institutions are merely "conduits" in the relevant transaction.

In United States v. Yalincak, No. 11-5446 (2nd Cir. Apr. 10, 2017) (Calabresi, Raggi, Lynch), the Second Circuit addressed a complicated issue of appellate procedure in the course of a decision on the law of restitution. Specifically, the Court weighed in on when a district court’s order crediting a defendant funds against his restitution obligations becomes a final, appealable order that cannot be revisited by the district court.

Not uncommonly, a preference complaint fails to adequately allege that the transfers sought to be recovered by the trustee were made “for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made”, as required under Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, when faced with a complaint to recover alleged preferential transfers, a defendant can proceed in one of two ways: (i) file an answer and raise affirmative defenses, or (ii) move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

With its landmark ruling in Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Large Private Beneficial Owners (In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig.), 818 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2016) ("Tribune 1"), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that claims asserted by creditors of the Tribune Co. ("Tribune") seeking to avoid payments to shareholders during a 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO") as constructive fraudulent transfers were preempted by the "safe harbor" under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Two recent cases analyzed the misrepresentations of a debtor regarding a single asset and held a written misrepresented value of a single scheduled estate asset would result in nondischargeability under Section 727, and that a verbal misrepresentation of a pre-petition asset to a creditor did not result in an exception to discharge under Section 523.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held that certain deposits and wire transfers into a bankrupt debtor’s personal, unrestricted checking account in the ordinary course of business were not “transfers” under § 101(54) of the Bankruptcy Code, affirming the district court’s and bankruptcy court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the bank in an adversary proceeding brought by the bankruptcy trustee.